

Asia in Review Archive (2017)
China (People’s Republic)
Date of AiR edition
News summary
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29 December 2017
China: First amendment of constitution since 2004 likely
(ls) The Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee decided Wednesday to discuss a proposal about amending parts of China’s Constitution at the second plenary session of the 19th CPC Central Committee in January. A constitutional revision is needed to set up the new National Supervision Commission, an all-encompassing anti-graft body. However, it has also been speculated that President Xi Jinping might seek to stay in office beyond 2022 after he unveiled a new leadership line-up in October that did not include a clear potential heir. Under the current national constitution, the president can only serve two five-year terms.
29 December 2017
China: Continued military/police reshuffle providing more power for Xi Jinping
(ls) Starting from 1 January 2018, China’s People’s Armed Police (PAP) will be under the command of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee and Central Military Commission (CMC). Both institutions are chaired by President Xi Jinping. Up until now, the PAP was controlled jointly by the State Council and the Central Military Commission. The PAP is a paramilitary police force that handles unrest, terrorism, and other conflicts involving civilians.
The move is part of a massive restructuring of the military that Xi introduced in late 2015 aimed at turning the People’s Liberation Army into a more nimble and modern fighting force. In September 2015, Xi announced that troop levels would be reduced by 300,000, taking the size of the fighting force to about 2 million.
Hans Spross of Deutsche Welle looks back on 2017 and describes how China’s leader Xi Jinping ends the year in an unassailable position of power, having consolidated his grip over the Communist Party and state. According to the analysis, Xi’s ultimate goal is to transform China into a global superpower.
29 December 2017
China: Internet crackdowns and imprisonment of bloggers
(ls) Chinese authorities shut down more than 13,000 websites for breaking laws and regulations governing the country’s internet network since 2015. While the government says its rules are aimed at ensuring national security and stability, human rights organizations have warned that the country’s tough laws governing the internet amount to repressive measures aimed at quashing dissent.
Against this background, Wu Gan, a blogger better known by his online name of Super Vulgar Butcher, who regularly addressed sensitive cases of government abuses of power, both online and in street protests, was sentenced to eight years in prison on charges of “subverting state power”. He has been in pretrial detention for more than two years after staging a protest outside a court. The embassies of the United States and Germany have issued a joint statement declaring that they were “deeply disappointed” by the sentence of Wu Gan.
29 December 2017
China: Court cases can now be filed via the WeChat application
Tencent Holdings’ WeChat, the ubiquitous social media application in China, has been adopted by Beijing Court as a means for people to file lawsuits electronically. Parties in a legal case can submit documents, verify their identification and pay legal fees through the WeChat prosecution service platform operated by Beijing Haidian court. While electronic filing of court documents is not new, China’s move to allow lawsuits to be filed using social media platforms is a new development, and would be akin to Americans being able to sue each other using Twitter or Facebook [South China Morning Post].
29 December 2017
India-USA relations: America needs India to become a great power
The values of human rights, democracy, and free-market economics have shaped the institutions and norms that have guided the free world since the end of World War II. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has tried to integrate those countries that don’t hold those same values into the international order. The author of this piece argues that the attempts to bring countries such as China and Russia into this rules-based order has failed, and argues that a democratic, diverse, and prosperous India can offer an alternative model to countries that wish to avoid the temptations of China and Russia’s authoritarianism [The National Interest].
29 December 2017
India-Nepal relations: Nepal’s Communists await the reins of power as India mulls how to mend ties
(kg) Nepal’s ruling “Nepali Congress Party” was overwhelmed in provincial and parliamentary elections held in that country earlier this month, faced a debacle in the recently held elections as the two Communist political parties handily won the majority of votes. While Prime Minister Deuba says he is eager to turn over the reins of power to the Maoist winners, Nepal’s major parties have failed to forge consensus on the National Assembly Election to pave way for the formation of new government [The Himalayan Times].
Regionally, Nepal’s election of a Communist coalition to rule for the next five years is widely viewed as a major victory for China and a major defeat for India. The author of The Wire’s article asserts that some of the roots of this historic election outcome were planted by New Delhi: it failed on many fronts, stemming from its failure to appreciate the impact of a devastating earthquake on the Nepali people, and political interference to its backing of an uprising and use of an economic blockade against Nepal. The author argues Nepali-Indian relations are too circumscribed by a narrow political and security lens: the answer to better ties between the two countries may lie in India’s willingness and ability to employ “soft power”. This soft power would use non-traditional diplomatic efforts to reinvigorate cultural connections, tong shared histories, and a deeper understanding of the Indo-Nepali relationship [The Wire].
In The Diplomat, Harsh V. Pant argues that, while New Delhi will be viewing the developments in Nepal with some concern, for Kathmandu there was greater room for maneuverability now between China and India. According to his analysis, India could and should not prevent Nepal from developing closer links with China so long as Kathmandu remains cognizant of vital Indian interests [The Diplomat].
29 December 2017
India-China relations: Talks and questions of intent in border dispute
(kg) Chinese state media reported this week that China and India have reached agreement to “properly handle” border disputes. The 20th round of talks between Chinese and Indian special representatives on boundary issues took place in New Delhi Friday. During the talks, both sides “agreed to strengthen strategic communication and boost strategic mutual trust” [Xinhua]. Just how far that “strategic mutual trust” goes remains to be seen, though, and the Doklam standoff is being closely monitored by all nations of the region.
Some are watching to determine if India will continue to support Bhutan against China. Southeast Asian nations are watching China’s reactions to India’s resistance, as a possible lesson to resolving their own border disputes in the future. What is likely, according to the author of this piece, is that China will try something different soon: it has a number of options to intimidate Bhutan and to impose costs on India as a result of its recent increase in force structure and infrastructure in the region. India, says the author, should be wary, and cannot expect China to make the same mistakes it has made in its recent gambits there [Eurasia Review].
29 December 2017
Pakistan-China relations: CPEC long-term plan says goodbye to US dollar
Under the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) initiative the Chinese currency RMB will be used for transactions, Pakistan announced this week. China and Pakistan agreed to stop using the US dollar for CPEC bilateral trade, loans, and repayments as well as profit repatriation. However, Pakistan insists its rupee will be used in Gwadar and other areas where CPEC projects are underway. China had demanded that its RMB be the currency used in Gwadar, but Pakistan rejected the demand [The News Pakistan].
29 December 2017
Maldives: Between India and China
Shortly after reaching a Free Trade Agreement with China and allowing Chinese warships to dock in its waters – and after a leading Maldives publication called India “an enemy nation” – the Maldives government is reaching out to New Delhi to demonstrate it is sensitive to India’s concerns. The Maldives’ President Abdulla Yameen disavowed the anti-India editorial, and now proclaims India his country’s “closest friend” and ally. A high-level visit is being planned, perhaps involving India’s Prime Minister Modi [First Post].
29 December 2017
Cross-Strait relations: Taiwan calls Chinese drills a major threat
(ls) Taiwan raised alarms over China’s growing military presence in a biennial defense white paper published for the first time under President Tsai Ing-wen on Tuesday, with a particular focus on Beijing’s stepped-up military drills in the West Pacific. Moreover, due to Taiwan’s location facing the South China Sea, East China Sea and the West Pacific, the report also said that the island could monitor the Chinese forces and provide an early warning to others about their activities [Nikkei Asian Review].
Last week, Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen took to Facebook to point out that China’s increasingly frequent military drills near Taiwan have affected regional stability, while motivating the military to stay vigilant in safeguarding the country against security threats. Her comments came a couple of days after China’s Air Force conducted its 10th drill near Taiwan since the conclusion of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in October [Focus Taiwan].
However, when asked about the continuing drills and the footage released by the air force, China’s policy-making Taiwan Affairs Office said it and the defense ministry had repeatedly described the exercises as routine. “Everyone will slowly get used it,” a spokesman told a routine news briefing, without elaborating [Reuters].
29 December 2017
On Sino-Vietnamese Relations
With ties between China and Vietnam improving of late, this article identifies both push and pull factors that will ensure both countries remain on this path despite each focusing on their own strategic calculations. The degree of scepticism will, however, remain large [ISEAS].
22 December 2017
China: Ubiquitous police state in Xinjiang
Xinjiang, the north-western Uygur autonomous region and China’s largest administrative unit, has rapidly become an omnipresent police state under Chen Quanguo, Communist Party Secretary for Xinjiang since 2016, with an unprecedented level of police and digital surveillance, mass disappearance and re-education camps. In a latest development of Chen’s campaign against Uygur separatism, authorities have been tracking the whereabouts of suspected terrorists among Uygur students studying in Islamic countries and pressuring parents to call their children back. Back in China, many of them end up in detention. Meanwhile, Radio Free Asia reports that close to 10% of residents of a township in Kashgar prefecture have been sent to prison or education camps this year over allegation of harboring extremist ideas.
22 December 2017
Public trials still regular practice
Despite official banning, public trials are still conducted by local authorities on a regular basis across the country. In such a trial this week conducted before thousands of spectators at a sport stadium in the southern city of Lufeng 10 people have been sentenced to death. The trial received mixed reactions of approval and refusal on social media [The Guardian].
22 December 2017
India-China-USA relations: China targets India as political tensions rise, while America highlights India’s leadership in its new security strategy
A senior Chinese PLA officer said last week that China should “thank” India last for “compelling” Beijing to address shortfalls in its military buildup in the contested Doklam border region. In revealing comments at the annual meeting of a leading official Communist Party press organ, other Chinese representatives opined that India is “challenging China and containing China in Asia” and is now, accordingly, one of China’s “strategic targets” [Global Times].
Meanwhile, in his first National Security Strategy (NSS) released Monday, U.S. President Donald Trump placed the “Indo-Pacific” at the very top of the regions addressed – in a marked departure from his predecessors’ strategies –, above Europe and the Middle East [Council of Foreign Relations].
The NSS says that Washington supports a leadership role for India in the Indo-Pacific region. As a means of countering “a wide range of threats”, Trump vowed to deepen America’s “strategic partnership with India and support its leadership role in Indian Ocean security and throughout the broader region.” His strategy also called for continued pressure on Pakistan to intensify counterterrorism efforts and safeguard its nuclear weapons. In addition, he framed the threats presented by China as “a geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world order is taking place in the Indo-Pacific region” [NDTV].
The third article analyzes the Trump’s National Security Strategy, providing historical perspective and background to the methodology. It is, says the author, a “sustainment” strategy supported by a peace-through-strength defense buildup. It continues America’s post–World War II–era national-security policy, but tailors it to today’s challenges and clearly states that America is presently in a great-power competition with Russia and China [National Review].
The fourth link is the NSS as presented by President Trump. It lays out the four vital national interests driving the strategy, and bases on the strategy on clear-eyed “principled realism”. It is, says the release, clear-eyed about global competition and it “is principled because it is grounded in the knowledge that promoting American values is key to spreading peace and prosperity around the globe” [White House].
22 December 2017
Pakistan-China relations: Beijing lavishes aid on Pakistan town
In a move that has fueled suspicion in New Delhi and Washington, China is lavishing vast amounts of aid on a small Pakistani fishing town that is strategically located on the Arabian Sea. Beijing has pledged half a billion USD in grants for an airport, hospital, college, and water infrastructure for the town of Gwadar. In return, China’s rulers hope to obtain access to – and potential military control of – some of the world’s busiest oil and gas shipping lanes [The Japan Times].
22 December 2017
China-Cambodia relations: Chinese-language schools pushing soft power
With Chinese – Cambodian ties getting steadily closer the market for Mandarin language education is significantly expanding with the support of local branch of the Confucius Institute (CI) with its network of language schools in more than 140 countries. The local CI works in collaboration with the Royal Academy of Cambodia but has also supported the set – up of a “Mandarin Center” at the Ministry of Defence in July reflecting the Cambodian dependency from Chinese weapon deliveries. Requests for Chinese language education have however, also come from at least seven other ministries reflecting a shift to a singular position of Chinese language education in the country as avenues to spread Chinese soft power [Reuters].
22 December 2017
China-Philippines relations: Nascent defense ties
Beijing and Manila after a break of four years have resumed the annual defense and security consultation (ADST) last week. This move reflects emerging defense ties between the two countries which within the frame of President Duterte’s ‘independent foreign policy’, do not exclude the possibility of stronger ties with Washington [The Diplomat].
22 December 2017
China-Laos relations: Beijing’s infrastructure funding rises
In a latest development reflecting an increasing dependence of Laos on Chinese development aid and funding, Vientianne witnessed last month a ground-breaking ceremony led by Chinese President Xi Jinping for the construction of a 90 Mio USD hospital. A prior Chinese infrastructure investment is US$6 billion high-speed rail, of which Laos own roughly 30% and of which the government is confident that it will transform the country into a job-creating modern logistics hub for Chinese trade. With a domestic product (GDP) per capita of less than 2,000 USD, which is one of the lowest rates in Asia, Laos is in dire need of foreign investment and cannot waive Beijing’s influx of money and assistance despite the risk granting Beijing political leverage over the country [Asia Times].
22 December 2017
Cross-Straits relations: China and Taiwan on the brink to war?
The usually high number of 10 PLA air force drills around Taiwan since the Party Congress in October have led to speculations whether those exercises could be a precursor for an invasion of Taiwan [South China Morning Post]. David Spencer, however, argues that the latest military exercises are a show of force to intimidate the Tsai government and an appeasement to saber-rattling hawks on the mainland [Taiwan News]. Meanwhile, the Taiwan’s Defense Minister has announced that his Ministry will stop issuing reports on China’s naval and air craft drills in order to demonstrate that Taiwan “will not dance to China’s tune as it tries to use psychological warfare against Taiwan” [Focus Taiwan].
15 December 2017
Upgrading PLA hardware and ‘heartware’ in the Xi Jinping Era
Since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012 he has successfully been pushing for the modernization of China’s military. At the party congress he expressed his vision of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) becoming a world-class force by 2050. With the progress of the PLA in terms of technical equipment and administrative structures comes, however, the need to advance operational culture and military ethos which might take generations according to James Char and Richard A Bitzinger in this article [East Asia Forum].
15 December 2017
Authorities collecting DNA from all residents of Xinjiang
In what is officially said to be an attempt of the government to ease poverty and secure social stability in the far Western Uighur-majority province of Xinjiang, but condemned by Human Rights Watch as massive human rights violation, government authorities in Uygur-majority Xinjiang province have been collecting – through medical checkups including iris scans and blood taking – bio-data of close to 19 Mio Xinjiang residents aged between 12-65 years [The Guardian].
15 December 2017
No. 2 worldwide in numbers of imprisoned journalists
According to recent findings of the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), China ranks second behind Turkey and ahead of Egypt in numbers of journalists jailed for their work. Out of a record number of 194 imprisoned journalist worldwide, 41 journalist are behind bars in China compared to 73 in Turkey and 20 in Egypt [Committee to Protect Journalists].
15 December 2017
China-US-Taiwan relations: Tensions over possible port calls of US Navy vessels in Taiwan
Congress’ passing of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for the 2018 fiscal year authorizing US Navy vessels visits to Taiwan and vice versa has met vehement outrage on the Chinese side. While the no. 2 of the Chinese embassy in Washington warned that such a visit at a port of the island could activate the Anti-Secession law which stipulates the use of military force against Taiwan in cases of developments interpreted by Beijing as possibly leading to the island’s independence, the Chinese Foreign Ministry criticized the law as a violation of the One-China policy and an interference in China’s internal affairs [The Maritime Executive] [Reuters]. Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry expressed gratitude to the US Congress for approving the the NDAA and dismissed the threats of violence made by the Washington embassy official as comments unconducive to Cross-Straits relations [Taipei Times]. J. Michael Cole in his assessment of the NDAA and the Chinese reactions argues that an invasion of Taiwan by the PLA is unlikely to follow a port call. However, Beijing will definitely requite such a move in some way with Taiwan as target [China Policy Institute: Analysis]. In a related move to warn Taiwan, Chinese warplanes on Monday conducted a series of exercises in the Western Pacific, including flying over the Bashi Channel between Taiwan and the Philippines and island encirclement patrols over Taiwan [South China Morning Post].
15 December 2017
China-India relations: No stand down from India-China high altitude standoff
India’s “Doklman Standoff” with China at a sensitive border area seemed to have ended nearly three months ago, but Chinese troops are taking unusual steps to establish a permanent, year-round presence there. This recent increase in tension at the border with Tibet and Bhutan results from the People’s Liberation Army construction of a road designed to help its forces move more quickly in the area – a move seen by India as a violation of its and Bhutan’s sovereignty. Previously, observers thought the two sides might back off tension during the winter months, as has been the case in the past. But China seems intent on maintaining its presence – and its pressure – in this particular contested region [Asia Times]. Meanwhile, an errant Indian drone that intruded into Chinese airspace near Doklam has Beijing’s official publications calling for Dehli to “wake up from its arrogance”. Tying the incident to the recently highly publicized U.S., Japan, Australia, and India “Quadralateral” security concept, Beijing’s paper warns India to not be “desperately stupid” and rely on the Quad for security. China, they say, “has full strategic say and initiative to teach the Indian military a lesson” [Global Times].
15 December 2017
China-Pakistan relations: Insecurity along China’s ‘belts & roads’
While some countries are having second thoughts about their initial enthusiasm to support China’s “One Belt One Road”, China also appears to be rethinking some of its major initiatives with partner countries. This reassessment has impacted its multi-billion dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Beijing has taken several road, mass-transit and industrial zone projects off the table, either temporarily or permanently. Why? Political chaos, corruption, and deteriorating law and order all play a role, as well as brutal tactics by some in Pakistan to sabotage CPEC [Asia Times]. Beijing’s official news organizations increasingly highlight the security threats posed along China’s OBOR, per the editorial in the second articled, which asserts assaults against Chinese overseas organizations and personnel have seen an upward trend and specifically cites Pakistan for the murder of two Chinese there recently. Islamabad has promised a 15,000-man army division to protect projects along the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, says this report, but the editors want China to do more to provide Chinese security along its “Belts & Roads” [Global Times]. In the final article, official Chinese media report that that Pakistani terrorists plan to launch a series of attacks on Chinese agencies and personnel in Pakistan in the near future. Last Friday, China’s embassy in Pakistan alerted Chinese agencies based there and Chinese citizens in the country to “boost security awareness, strengthen internal precautions, minimize outdoor activities and avoid going to crowded places” [China Daily].
15 December 2017
China-Sri Lanka relations: Formal hand over of Hambantota Port
China now controls Sri Lanka’s strategic southern port of Hambantota, in a move that is supposed to help the impoverished country repay more than $8 billion USD it reportedly owes Beijing. Sri Lankan opposition leaders call the $1.1 billion USD 99-year lease a “sell out”. The ports are expected to play a key role in China’s global Belt and Road initiative. Analysts say that while China gets an industrial-economic zone and strategic deep water port with tremendous military potential on the Indian Ocean, Sri Lanka is stuck paying back massive loans far into the future without the benefit of an income stream from the port due to the large tax concessions granted to the Chinese firms who manage the lease [NDTV].
15 December 2017
Counter-Terrorism in Asia: India, Russia, China resolve to step up cooperation
India, China, and Russia agreed this week to increase counter terrorism cooperation as well as more effectively fight the illegal drug trade, during an annual trilateral meeting of foreign ministers. While all three countries called on states to take measures to prevent terrorist activity in their territory, India also express concerns over increasing acts of terrorism by Pakistan-based terror groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). This year’s agreements assume significance as China has been blocking the international efforts sanction a Pakistani terrorist leader who was the mastermind of a major terror attack in India [Outlook India]. Meanwhile, Michael Kugelman informs in his research report about signs of Pakistani government progress in countering the extremism and terrorist activity in North Waziristan which has been described as “the most dangerous place on earth”. There has been a sharp decrease in terror-related civilian deaths in recent years. But there is also reason to question the degree and endurance of the success, and obtained a clearer understanding of disconnects in U.S. and Pakistani perceptions of the terror threat in the region [War on the Rocks].
15 December 2017
Yang Jiechi: Xi Jinping’s Top Diplomat Back in His Element
Elected to the Politburo Standing Committee at the recent Party Congress, former top diplomat and Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi has become the arbiter of China’s foreign affairs. Yi Wang informs in this article about his background and career path [China Brief: The Jamestown Foundation] .
8 December 2017
Xi Jinping: Strongman Among Rivals
The National Party Congress has confirmed Xi Jinping as the most powerful leader since Mao Zedong. He, however, will not be able to rule in a totalitarian, unchecked way like Mao because of party-external and -internal factors, argues Gregory J. Moore. First, despite an unprece-dented degree of surveillance, which critics see as a precursor to an Orwellian society, China’s population today is much more educated, wealthier, and aware of the party’s politics and policies than in Mao’s time. Xi is facing a totally different public. Second, among the seven mem-bers of the Politburo Standing Committee four are considered to be protégés of Xi’s predeces-sors Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin. These fractional rivalries will keep Xi in check.
8 December 2017
Westminster School to teach Chinese curricu-lum in China
Westminster School, one of UK’s top independ-ent schools, will next week sign an agreement with a Hong Kong education group according to which Westminster will by 2028 establish six private schools with China’s national curricu-lum. The opening of the first of these six ‘private schools’ which – different from ‘international schools’- allow enrolments of Chinese students – is scheduled for 2020. Teaching political educa-tion would be under direction of the Communist Party [Financial Times].
8 December 2017
India-China relations: Square off for sub-region navel supremacy
Sino-Indian naval competition for the Indian Ocean continues to intensify. China is considering deployment of warships to the Pakistani port of Gwadar, a move that would be of “grave concern” for India [The Nation]. Beijing intends to develop Gwadar as a key hub in its global “Belt & Road” initiative, and claims it is a commercial aspect of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Based on the PRC’s incremental expansion of its military presence in Africa and elsewhere, sustained PRC military use of Gwadar is clearly probable, but such plans have not been formally announced. Meanwhile, Beijing continues to expand its commercial engagement and infrastructure development with Pakistan, to include high-level discussions of a free trade agreement. In related developments, the second article reports India’s confirmation this week of its “mega-project” to build six nuclear submarines [Business Standard]. India also signaled its readiness to play a bigger in the proposed quadrilateral coalition with the US, Australia, and Japan. The third article reports a major Indian naval exercise at the time a Chinese nuclear submarine will transit into the Indian Ocean early next year [Times of India]. Finally, the fourth article examines China’s maritime strategy for the Indian Ocean, and the response of India and other countries to its advances into the sub-region [CIMSEC].
8 December 2017
China-Maldives relations: ‘Fast-Tracked’ Trade Pact Under Fire
In a rushed, short-notice night time vote, Maldives’ parliament last week voted to approve a free trade agreement (FTA) with China. No opposition members participated in the vote (Mihaaru). The ruling party asserts the FTA will boost the fisheries industry and tourism sector, while the opposition alleges it will be detrimental to the Maldives’ economy “as balance of trade is greatly in favor of China.” The vote has drawn fire from the opposition for both its procedural irregularities and its content. India’s perspective on the vote is reflected in the second article (The Economic Times). The pact, says Indian observers, will “push Maldives towards a debt trap like Sri Lanka”, and place the country in a geo-politically vulnerable position. India is also concerned that China is planning for a naval base in the Maldives. But there’s no need for India’s concern, per the third article from an official PRC press organ: although Maldives’ fast-tracking of the FTA with China seems to have caught New Delhi off guard, the pact does not “target any third party, India included” (China Daily). China suggest that “Indian media should not read too much into the deal”. Meanwhile, per a report from another offical Chinese state organ, Maldivian President Abdulla Yameen Abdul Gayoom will pay a state visit to China from Wednesday through Saturday of this week, at the invitation of Chinese President Xi Jinping (Global Times). While the topics of discussion for the visit have not been released, the FTA and naval basing are certain to be high on the agenda.
8 December 2017
China-Japan relations: Signs of improvement
Reflecting slowly improving ties between China and Japan, both countries agreed on Wednesday to set up communication mechanisms aimed at preventing maritime and aerial clashes in and above disputed areas of the East China Sea [The Asahi Shimbun].
8 December 2017
China-Australia relations: The South China Sea and Chinese influence on Australia’s domestic politics
China has for the first time confirmed the deployment of fighter jets to Woody Island in the disputed South China Sea, state media have reported. The Chinese military sent J-11B fighters to the island in the contested Paracel chain. While fighter jets had been spotted on the island in 2016 and in April this year, the footage was the first time Beijing had confirmed the deployments [Japan Times]. Australia took a strong stance on the South China Sea issue in its newly published Foreign Policy White Paper, urging both China and the Philippines to follow the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s July 2016 ruling. In response, both the Chinese defense ministry and Chinese foreign ministry criticized Australia for its “irresponsible remarks”. However, a Chinese spokesman also noted the positive evaluation of China’s development and China-Australia relations [The Diplomat]. At the same time, out of concern about rising Chinese influence, Australia is preparing itself to ban foreign political donations as part of a crackdown aimed at preventing external interference in domestic politics. The new laws would ban foreign donations to political parties or any political group that has spent more than A$100,000 ($76,350) campaigning in the past four years. Australian Prime Minister Turnbull emphasized that the new law would not target any specific country [Reuters] [China Policy Institute: Analysis]. China’s Foreign Ministry’s vehemently dismissed the accusations of interference in Australian domestic politics urging Australia to abstain from aanti-China bias objectively evaluate Sino-Australian relations without an anti-China bias [Xinhua News (in Chinese)].
8 December 2017
One Belt, One Road initiative: Nepal, Pakistan wary of PRC investment – and Control
In the past two weeks, Nepal and Pakistan have rejected three infrastructure projects with China worth nearly $20 billion. They join a growing list of countries re-thinking Chinese infrastructure investment as Beijing aggressively pursues its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative [Quartz]. This article and the second article detail the common problems cited for countries refusing Chinese involvement in key projects: simply put, they don’t like Chinese pressure and they now realize that the infrastructure that is built will likely end up being controlled by China [Voice of America]. Nepal reflects the common pattern for China to sign controversial projects when a pro-China government is in place, only to have a new government cancel the contract once the opposition party takes control. A Dec. 7 vote could reverse the cancellation decision, if the Nepali Communist Party takes the reins of power again.
8 December 2017
China’s economic engagement in Southeast Asia: Taking concrete shapes
As support from traditional development aid sources decrease, Indonesia receives foreign aid to an increasing extent from China and other non-DAC (Development Assistance Committee) countries. China’s aid to Indonesia has financed bridges, roads, power plants and a limited number of railway projects, all designed and constructed by Chinese firms. However, Pierre van der Eng submits that Indonesia could face the dilemma of whether it can continue to limit the influence of aid donors on its development policies when the delivery of bilateral foreign aid for infrastructure depends increasingly on a single provider [East Asia Forum]. In Thailand, the government just approved the country’s first high-speed railway, spearheaded by China, an on-again-off-again project that was once hailed as the crowning project of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative. The National Environment Commission accepted the environmental impact assessment report for the 253- kilometer portion from Bangkok to the northeastern province of Nakhon Ratchasima. Over years, Chinese and Japanese construction firms had contested in the bidding process [Asia Times]. Meanwhile, Myanmar and China agreed to build an economic corridor between the two countries, furthering Naypyitaw’s efforts to strengthen ties with Beijing as criticism over the Rohingya refugee crisis pushes it away from the West. Beijing plans to build a deep-sea port as well as an industrial park. It also started up in April a crude oil pipeline linking Kyaukpyu and Kunming, providing an alternate route for oil shipments that does not pass through the Strait of Malacca [Nikkei Asian Review]. Before this background, the South China Morning Post asks whether an all-powerful Xi Jinping and an emboldened China are good for Southeast Asia. Karim Raslan draws historic comparisons to the Qing dynasty’s greatest emperors Kangxi, Yongzheng and Qianlong. However, he submits that, while China seems on the upswing now, another stumble could well be on the way, if the looming debt crisis and growing domestic income inequalities were not resolved. Moreover, he writes that Southeast Asian countries are unwilling to be hegemonized [South China Morning Post].
1 December 2017
Human rights concerns amid mass evictions of migrants in Beijing
After 19 people died in a fire this past week in a mixed residential area in Beijing, the city’s administration reacted by intensifying inspections of potential fire hazards. This has led to a large number of evictions, mainly affecting the many migrant workers living in the capital. An open letter to the country’s leadership circulated on social media has criticised the action as “trampling” human rights as many evictions happened with very little to no notice and did not follow any due process. International rights groups see a connection to another controversial policy by Beijing authorities which targets to cut Beijing’s downtown population by 15% over the next two years [The Guardian].
1 December 2017
Indian-Chinese relations: Cmpetition over Myanmar and Nepal
India’s leaders see Myanmar’s Rohingya refugee crisis and the situation in Rakhine as an opportunity for China to try to expand its strategic partnership with Myanmar and its influence in the region. China has offered to broker a deal between Myanmar and Bangladesh regarding the Rohingya, and to create economic projects in the ravaged Rakhine zone. In response, India kicked off a military exercise with Myanmar last week to keep the country’s military engaged. This was followed by 3,000 family relief packs delivered to Rakhine on Friday. With regional political and economic supremacy at stake, the contest between India and China for this strategic part of Asia is intensifying [Times of India]. Nepal announced this week that a state-owned power company will develop its biggest hydroelectric plant, after the government scrapped a $2.5-billion deal with a Chinese company, citing lapses in the award process. Nepal’s rivers, cascading from the snow-capped Himalayas, have vast, untapped potential for hydropower generation. The country is one of several geo-political battlegrounds between its giant neighbors China and India. The opposition Communist UML party has said it would hand back the project to China if voted to power after elections that began Sunday [Asahi Shimbun].
1 December 2017
Cross-Strait relations, travel destinations and non-interference
AiR reported recently on some difficulties in cross-strait relations, including the case of Human rights advocate Lee Ming-Che [AiR], who has now been jailed in China on “subversion of state” charges [BBC] [Taipei Times]. In another spat, Beijing has taken both the Vatican and Palau in the Pacific off a list of possible destinations for Chinese tourists in an effort to increase pressure on them as they are two of the few remaining countries that entertain official diplomatic relations with Taiwan [Taiwan News]. The move has been criticised in Taiwanese newspapers, for example pointing out that this kind of influence-seeking behaviour does not at all correspond with China’s cherished principle of non-interference into the matters of other countries [Taipei Times II]. Banning destinations for Chinese tour groups is something Beijing also continues to do with South Korea, where it strongly condemns the THAAD deployment [Global Times]. In another incident of Beijing not approving of local circumstances, it has voiced concerns regarding an anti-Chinese Tibet protest at a football match in Germany last week. It argues Germany should not allow separatist, anti-China or terrorist activities, to which the president of the German Football Association responded: “It has been made clear to the Chinese federation that when you play in Germany you also have to deal with the fact that anyone can express their opinion.” [The Guardian]
1 December 2017
China-Myanmar relations
With most of the international community condemning Myanmar and their handling of the refugee crisis, China continues to support the regime and is playing an increasing role in mediation and discussions on the issue. Beijing seeks a “strategic stability” in Myanmar and is focused on safeguarding its OBOR project for which the country is in a vital geographical position. Whether China’s influence can bring either strategic stability or lasting peace is very much uncertain [Reuters] [Asia Times] [South China Morning Post] [Ministry of Foreign Affairs PRC].
1 December 2017
China and Europe
This week, China and the Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) summit takes place in Budapest. Present are China and 16 Central and Eastern European countries discussing financing channels and development cooperation [Gov.cn] [Ministry of Foreign Affairs PRC]. With tensions between some Eastern European states (including hosting country’s Victor Orban) and the EU high, it is not inconceivable that China can make some inroads in gaining influence in the EU. After all, about two third of the Central and European countries at the summit are EU members as well.
1 December 2017
A photo trip along the ancient Silk Road
As China is poised to revive the Silk Road as an economic and geopolitical connection between East Asia and Europe, this visual trip winds its way through parts of Kazakhstan, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. It features the Gobi Desert, the Flaming Mountains, the Singing Sands, the City of Screams, and other ancient and modern artifacts along the ancient Silk Road [The Atlantic].
24 November 2017
Beijing vies for greater control of foreign academic and media influence
In line with Xi Jinping’s word’s at the National Party Congress “Government, military, society and schools — north, south, east and west — the party is leader of all”, the Ministry of Education has issued a directive according to which foreign funded universities are ordered to establish CCP units and give decision-making power to a party representative. This order, applying to more than 2000 Sino-overseas joint ventures, follows a string of measures recently taking by the government in order to tighten control over education, including the establishment of Xi Jinping Thought centers in universities or pressuring foreign publishing houses to block access to articles and educational material, the latest example of which is Sage publishing house which confirmed this week to have received a warning of the government on a possible censorship request. Meanwhile, Australia’s largest publisher Allen & Unwin’s decision to delay the publication of the book “Silent Invasion: How China Is Turning Australia into a Puppet State” marks the first case of a foreign publisher bowing to Chinese pressure in the home country.
24 November 2017
626 million surveillance cameras expected within 3 years
With 176 million surveillance cameras installed in 2016 and an expected increase up to more von 620 million in 2020, China’s surveillance industry is moving forward with high speed outpacing any other country including the UK regarded as the world’s most monitored country. Chinese Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology of which 42% belongs to the Chinese government is the world’s largest producer of CCTV cameras and video surveillance facilities [Technode].
24 November 2017
Another high-profile party member arrested on corruption suspicion
In another prominent case of the government’s anti-corruption campaign against high ranking state officials and party members, Lu Wei, former head of the Cyberspace Administration of China, has been arrested in the context of an internal anti-graft probe. Lu has served as Xi Jinping’s right hand in the cyber-security policy implementation. Meanwhile, reflecting continued efforts of the Chinese government to control the cyberspace, Skype has been blocked from Apple app stores on grounds of violating laws. Prior to Skype, other communication programs such as Gmail, Facebook, Twitter, Line, and Telegram has been blocked by the Chinese government.
24 November 2017
The new military leaders
Within his overhaul of the China’s military leadership, Xi Jinping has reduced the number of members of the Central Military Commission from ten to six and staffed it with five loyal aides. James Char in this article shares insights about their career paths and their relationship to Xi thereon [East Asia Forum].
24 November 2017
India: ‘Quad’ and OBOR
In the face of a radically altered strategic situation in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, India is working with the US, Japan and Australia to resurrect the concept of a quadrilateral alignment of democracies. The “Quad” is not a new concept: it was conceived more than a decade ago, but the concept failed due to weak political will and pressure from its presumed target of deterrence, China. Will the idea materialise this time? And is the idea of Quad bigger than what is generally perceived — a partnership to contain China’s illiberal and hegemonic designs? The author of this Op-Ed examines the history of the Quad concept, the China deterrence aspect, and larger strategic issues the Quad can address. He concludes it is a “win-win” for India to pursue it. Meanwhile, the Chinese Communist Party enshrined President Xi Jinping’s “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) into its constitution at the 19th National Congress in October. This massive global infrastructure investment plan at least partly prompted last week’s quadrilateral meeting between senior officials from the United States, Japan, India, and Australia on the future of a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” India’s participation in the dialogue signals that China’s method of implementing the BRI is driving a wedge between these neighbours. By its heavy-handed treatment of sovereignty disputes, China has lent credence to critics of the BRI who see it as a nationalist endeavour rather than a program of international cooperation. Fuelled by suspicions of China’s ulterior motives for BRI and its China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, India has increased cooperation with other powers [The Daily Times (Pakistan)] [The National Interest].
24 November 2017
India-China relations: A new bipolarity in Asia on the rise
With China’s assertiveness and ambitions for global leadership on the one side, boldly reaffirmed in Xi Jinping’s speech at the recent Party Congress, and India’s growing self-confidence in claiming regional power status, reinforced by the latest developments in US-India ties and Washington’s reassurances of the importance of a free and open Indo-Pacific region, the trend towards a Sino-Indo bipolar order in Asia is clearly discernable. However, to sustain such an order India would be required to form a bloc among Asian countries aimed at containing China. This will be a huge challenge, given China’s determination to bring by force and economic incentives more and more countries on her side [The Hindu].
24 November 2017
Japan-China relations: East China Sea tensions
Prime Minister Abe last week expressed his determination to strengthen Japan’s defense capabilities and push for the development of own missiles capable of striking targets on land and at sea to defend the country’s sovereignty on remote islands [South China Morning Post]. The expected Chinese reaction followed shortly: On Saturday and Sunday Chinese military and intelligence aircraft flew through international airspace between the Japanese islands of Okinawa and Miyako in the East China Sea prompting Tokyo to scramble jet fighters [The Diplomat]. In a related move, Chinese bombers and jets were detected flying over the Bashi Channel located between Taiwan and the Philippines on Thursday [Reuters].
24 November 2017
China’s Rise and Dominance in the South China Sea
Two articles dealing with the rise and development of China under communist rule since 1949 and her dominant position in the South China Sea by Jan Kliem and Grant Newsham are available in the latest issue of CPG’s Online Magazine [CPG COM].
17 November 2017
Amendments to Party Statute for a new era under Xi’s imperial rule?
Reflecting Xi Jinping’s undisputed power as the outcome of the 19th National Party Congress, the revision of the Statute of the Chinese Communist Party – the de facto constitution of the country – made at the congress stipulates the ‘Founding of a New China’ under the guidance of Xi’s thought on ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era’ enshrined. With his name introduced 11 times in the new statute and 15 out of the 25 members of the Politburo considered loyal to Xi as well as his elevation to the ‘core of the party’s leadership’, the question arises whether Xi has become an ‘Emperor’.
17 November 2017
China: Recent accounts on human rights violations
In the book ‘The People’s Republic of the Disappeared: Stories from Inside China’s System for Enforced Disappearances’, published this week, leading human rights lawyer Wang Yu has come forward with an account on the human rights violations she had endured during her forced disappearance and two years of secret detention. Meanwhile, Human Rights Watch on Wednesday published interviews with LGBT people revealing human rights violations during conversion therapies in public and private hospitals to which young Chinese gays and lesbians, bisexual and trans-genders are commonly pressured by their families. Therapy measures include forced medication and electro-shocks.
17 November 2017
India and the US: Natural allies and the re-emergence of the quadrilateral coalition
In wake of the US-Indian rapprochement on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Manila, India, the US, Japan, and Australia have held their first meeting to revive their coalition, ‘the quad’, with the explicit aim to ensure an open Indo-Pacific zone. The respective public statements highlight the major objectives — beside the ultimate goal to contain China: upholding the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific, freedom of navigation and overflight, increasing connectivity, countering terrorism and upholding maritime security. Remarkably, while the US, Australia and Japan also emphasized talks on the DPRK nuclear issue, India, still fostering relations with Pyongyang, skipped the discussion on North Korea in its respective readout [The Times of India].
In the context of the rapprochement, the US have announced significant statements on the new partnership such as the White House Principal Deputy Press Secretary, the highest-ranking Indian-American ever in the White House press wing ever, telling Indian reporters that “India is a natural ally of the United States” while stressing the particular good personal relationships between both country´s leaders Trump and Modi [The Economic Times].
More remarkable have been U.S. Secretary of State Tillerson’s words on India before he visited the country recently talking about a “profound transformation that’s taking place, one that will have far-reaching implications for the next 100 years: The United States and India are increasingly global partners with growing strategic convergence” and both nations being “two bookends of stability — on either side of the globe — standing for greater security and prosperity for our citizens and people around the world”. Even more remarkably, the national interest has scaled the respective speech the “most prominent speech since taking office” [National Interest].
Reinforcing Tillerson’s words, President Trump, in his speech on the US strategy towards Asia at the APEC Summit in Vietnam, highlighted the importance of a free and open Indo-Pacific region and announced US support of India’s membership in the APEC as the world’s seventh and Asia’s third largest economy [Forbes].
17 November 2017
Sri Lanka: In the geopolitical focus of the great powers
With an increasing competition over the Indian Ocean, Sri Lanka has shifted into the geopolitical focus of the major actors struggling for influence. In this context, Indian Prime Minister Modi has assured Sri Lankan President Maithripala Sirisena of all possible assistance in response to Sri Lanka’s request for emergency petroleum shipments and India’s generally continued support for development cooperation [DDI News]. At the same time, a Chinese foreign minister official stressed that China would not attach any strings when extending financial assistance to Sri Lanka and not use an investigation into alleged human rights violations or war crimes as a precondition for aid [Daily Mirror].
A similarly vexatious game has been staged at the security front. After ships of the US Nimitz Carrier Strike Group have recently pulled into Sri Lanka for the first time since 1985 [Defense.gov], the Chinese People’s Liberation Army – Navy Ship ‘Qi Ji Guang’ has not visited the country [Defence.lk].
17 November 2017
Cambodia: China helps with internet governance as online controls tighten
Cambodia and China signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on e-commerce cooperation on Friday, by which China will provide technical advice to help boost e-commerce in the kingdom. According to an official statement released by the Cambodian Ministry of Commerce, the agreement is an important element of the government’s “rectangular strategy” and a component of China’s One Belt, One Road Initiative [Khmer Times]. Meanwhile, the Cambodian government has stepped up efforts to curtail online freedom of expression and political opposition. A pending cybercrime law is raising concerns about legal limits on what users are allowed to post on the internet, as charges of sedition and defamation are already used to silence dissenters [Voice of America].
17 November 2017
Philippines-US relations: Vital for military – less so for trade
US president Donald Trump said that strong US ties with the Philippines were vital for military reasons, as he ended a trip to Manila, the last stop on his tour of Asia: “We have a very, very strong relationship with the Philippines, which is really important: less so for trade, in this case, than for military purposes.” [South China Morning Post 1] Duterte, for his part, seems to have warmed to the United States and President Trump as the current US president did not, as his predecessor had done, remind the Philippine leader to follow the rule of law in tackling the illegal drug trade [New York Times 1]. But the longer-term game for Mr. Duterte has been his determination to court China. A spokesman described his policy as a deliberate turn toward closer relationships with countries in Asia, and with China in particular [New York Times 2]. It is against this background that both the Philippines as well as Vietnam have been wary of Trumps offer to mediate in the South China Sea dispute [South China Morning Post 2]. However, in terms of trade, critics warn that joining the Regional Comprehensive Economic Cooperation (RCEP) that includes major players such as China, India, Japan and South Korea would be a “suicide plan” [Inquirer].
17 November 2017
China: Xi visits Vietnam and Laos following APEC Summit
President Xi has wrapped up consecutive state visits to both Vietnam and Laos this week. Besides economic cooperation, in Vietnam, the South China Sea featured high on the agenda [ABC]. In Laos, infrastructure and cooperation were talked about with the goal of a China-Laos economic corridor [ChinaPlus]. Vietnam and Laos, like China, are ruled by their respective communist parties.
17 November 2017
China: Belt and Woes
China is not experiencing all but love from its neighbours it seeks to cooperate with on huge infrastructure projects under its Belt and Road umbrella. Not only are neighbours wary due to four distinct areas of PLA reform and capability enhancements [Asia Times], some are not always so keen on infrastructure projects on their soil under Chinese terms. In Thailand for instance, the high-speed rail project has faced some real difficulties, as have projects in Indonesia and even Laos [The Nation]. Nepal, in a move this week, has signaled it will cancel a deal huge deal with a Chinese SOE to build a hydropower plant [South China Morning Post].
17 November 2017
Cross-Straits Relations and Taiwanese Southbound Policy
Since the election of Tsai Ing-wen of the rather independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party in early 2016, cross-straits relations have been strained and arguably deteriorated from where they had been under her predecessor Ma Ying-jeou. Amongst many examples, the People’s Republic of China is said to have used coercion and threats in order to block even “non-governmental” Taiwanese participation in recent UN climate talks [Reuters]. At the same time, Beijing and Taipei have agreed to cooperate on a very interesting, potentially even militarily relevant project, relating to surveillance satellite data sharing on earthquake tracking [South China Morning Post]. Besides, Taiwan is aiming to bolster exchanges with Malaysia. While bilateral trade, educational exchanges as well as tourism have already increased, the Taiwanese government aims at more. Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy, initiated by President Tsai Ing-wen, is aimed at strengthening relationships through economic cooperation, talent development and resource-sharing with 16 countries in Southeast and South Asia, as well as Australia and New Zealand [Focus Taiwan].
17 November 2017
China-Japan/ROK: A new start for bilateral ties?
With both Abe and Xi having consolidated their positions of strength at home, and a common interest in controlling the situation in North Korea – if out of very different motivations – the time for a potential improvement in Japan-China ties is better than it has been in years [The Japan Times]. Despite talks held at the sidelines of the recent APEC meeting in Vietnam, and Xi reportedly foreseeing a “new start” in bilateral relations there, the relationship is still heavily fraught. China’s growing naval ambitions may well rekindle the somewhat dormant conflict in the East China Sea, whilst Abe is making a point out of defying some of Beijing’s parameters by for example meeting a Taiwan official almost directly after meeting Xi [Bloomberg]. The North Korean nuclear threat also proves helpful to a careful, ongoing détente between China and South Korea, who have agreed on a visit by the South Korean president to China in December [Reuters].
17 November 2017
5 maps that explain China (and its strategy)
This article features an interesting approach, looking at geostrategic realities and statistical maps to infer Chinese National and Foreign Policy Strategy. Recommended reading! [Business Insider]
10 November 2017
Challenges on the way to global leadership
At the National Party Congress, President Xi Jinping announced a new era in which China will assume the position of a global leader. On the way to realize what he coined the China Dream, Xi will have to overcome enormous challenges, domestically and internationally, Yanzhong Huang argues. Among them are the challenges in the wake of a looming Middle Income Trap, the growing demands for more transparency of the party’s rule within the population, as well as a possible clash with the USA out of the dialectical dynamics of the struggle for global hegemony.
10 November 2017
New legislation on corruption and national anthem
Further widening its large-scale anti-corruption campaign, the Chinese government has released a draft law which mandates the establishment of a ministerial super-body with powers of investigating, interrogating and detaining civil servants, as well as freezing their assets and seizing their property [Reuters]. In a parallel move, the government decided to nationwide install from next year on supervisory commissions at provincial, county, and local level with the power to supervise public functionaries’ execution of duty and ethical conduct and investigate illegal activities such as graft, misuse of authority, neglect of duty and wasting public funds. The commissions will also be entitled to issue administrative penalties and transfer suspected criminal cases to the procuratorates [Xinhua]. Meanwhile, the parliament approved an amendment of the law on the protection of the national anthem which had been enacted only a month ago. The new law increases the original punishment for public insult of the national anthem from 15 days to up to three years imprisonment [The New York Times].
10 November 2017
India: Geopolitical allies
Reflecting her growing ambitions and influence, India has offered to share real-time intelligence of maritime movements in the Indian Ocean with 10 countries that participated in a Naval Conclave at the Indian Naval War College last week (Myanmar, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Mauritius, Bangladesh, Maldives, Seychelles and Singapore ). Analysts believe India’s proposal is aimed at countering China’s growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean Region: it comes at a time when China is becoming increasingly aggressive in the South China Sea region and recently established its first overseas base in the Horn of Africa country of Djibouti. India is still assessing the regional response to its offer [Mizzima]. Meanwhile, following the first shipment of Indian wheat at the Iranian Chabahar port, Indian officials have announced that both countries are in discussions about the begin of interim operations at the port. India’s Chabahar engagement dates back a decade, but it has gained strategic importance with India signing Chabahar Agreement with Afghanistan and Iran 2016 allowing India’s access to Afghanistan through the port [Business Insider].
10 November 2017
China-US trade relations:
Despite the signing of trade deals worth more than 250 Billion USD [South China Morning Post 1] during President Trump’s stop in China during his Asia trip, the openness of the US market to Chinese companies vis-à-vis the structural barriers to access the Chinese market remain a critical issue in US-China relations [South China Morning Post 2]. Former chief CIA representative in China Randy Philipps addresses this issue in a recent interview on US-China relations [NPR]. Meanwhile, US lawmakers have submitted a bill to the Congress proposing greater scrutiny of Chinese investments in the field of sensitive technology by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States [The New York Times].
10 November 2017
China: Show of outer space and naval capabilities
Following last week’s announcement of the launch of the world’s first spaceplane in 2020, China on Sunday sent a navigational satellite to the orbit with the potential to compete with GPS. The launch is part of a plan to install within three years a satellite network capable of supporting military operations across the globe independent from existing foreign navigational systems [South China Morning Post]. In an assertive show of power, Beijing unveiled its ‘island maker vessel’ just the day before President Trump’s Asia trip kicked off on Sunday with his visit to Japan. The vessel is said to be deployed for further land reclamations in the highly contested South China Sea [BBC]. Meanwhile, China’s largest and most advanced training ship is scheduled to arrive in Sri Lanka this week for a four-day goodwill visit. The PLAN ship Qi Jiguang is heading towards Sri Lanka from Italy, as part of its mission to conduct visits to Portugal, Italy, Sri Lanka and Thailand [The Daily Mirror].
10 November 2017
The Philippines: No occupation of any “new” territory in the South China Sea
Philippine constructions on a newly built sandbar have drawn strong condemnation from China as it violates an agreement by the two countries not to occupy any new territory. Philippine President Duterte ordered a stop to the construction of a rather insignificant structure there, highlighting the need for a thoughtful mechanism to deal with these type of incidents as and when they occur [The Straits Times].
10 November 2017
Terrorism and international relations
Last week, China blocked a bid at the United Nations by the US, France, and Britain to list the chief of Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) militant group, Maulana Masood Azharas, a global terrorist. Azhar is accused of several significant terrorist attacks in India. China’s move is doing “material harm” to the already stressed India-China relationship and affirms Delhi’s belief in Sino-Pakistani collusion, top American experts say. China’s timing is significant, coming on the heels of Washington’s stronger rhetoric against Pakistan’s support for terrorism and China’s blocking of India’s application to become a member of the 15- nation UN Security Council [Deccan Herald/Press Trust of India].
10 November 2017
Chinese foreign investments in Southeast Asia
These two very good ISEAS essays tackle the issue of Chinese investment into Southeast Asia and stake out the controversial aspects of a heavily unbalanced relationship. Whereas the first essay deals with Southeast Asia in general, the second piece looks at Cambodia in particular. Both pieces question the common wisdom of “no strings attached loans”, citing growing political influence with a larger economic clout. Chinese FDI into ASEAN looks modest, but is increasing substantially and more significant when Chinese FDI re-routed through Hong Kong is taken into consideration. Chinese FDI into Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar is much greater than into other ASEAN countries [ISEAS 1, ISEAS 2].
3 November 2017
Spreading Xi’s Jinping’s thought
Within a week after Xi Jinping’s thought had been enshrined in China’s constitution at the Na-tional Party Congress, 20 universities across the country have established research institutions dedicated to teaching, researching and promot-ing Xi’s ideas on “Socialism with Chinese Char-acteristics for a New Era”. Meanwhile, after Cambridge University Press had decided to block access to some of their articles in China as per request of Chinese authorities and then after an international outcry reversed its decision back in August this year, German owned publisher Springer Nature has now made a similar decision and pulled a number of articles on topics deemed sensitive by the Chinese government. Whilst academics cry out again, Springer Nature thus far stands by its decision, arguing that by making some concessions, the largest part of their con-tents remains accessible.
3 November 2017
Secretive spaceplane scheduled for 2020
Reflecting China’s ambitions in the field of space science, scientists of state-owned China Aero-space Science and Technology Corporation have announced 2020 as date for the launch of a spaceplane which would not launch into space aboard a rocket but instead would operate as a true runway-to-space-to-runway vehicle [Technica].
3 November 2017
Japan foreign policy: The Philippines, Russia
Japan has pledged to provide assistance for the Philippines as it rebuilds Marawi City in its Southern Mindanao as well as help with other projects ranging from rail infrastructure to river defences. Japan is concerned about China’s growing power in the South China Sea and sees cooperation with the Philippines, which lies on the waterway’s eastern side, as key ally in helping prevent Beijing’s influence spreading into the western Pacific [Asian Correspondent]. China has previously pledged to provide over US$24 billion in development aid and investment largely for infrastructure development. Some analysts, however, suggest Beijing may be withholding the funds until the bilateral relationship is more firmly consolidated, including in regard to unresolved territorial disputes in the South China Sea [Asia Times]. Meanwhile, Japan and Russia have agreed to set up a task force to jointly develop tourism and four other businesses on disputed islands controlled by Russia but claimed by Tokyo. Japan hopes joint economic activities will pave the way for settling a decades-old territorial row with Russia, while Moscow aims to attract Japanese investment to the underdeveloped islets off Japan’s northernmost main island of Hokkaido. [Kyodo News]. Russia, for its part, is increasingly wielding oil as a geopolitical tool, spreading its influence around the world and challenging the interests of the United States. Through the state oil giant Rosneft, Moscow is trying to build influence in places where the United States has stumbled or power is up for grabs [New York Times].
3 November 2017
China’s “New Era” foreign policy under Xi
Whilst China is continuing to make strides in modernizing its military, e.g. with a supposed breakthrough in relation to its newest aircraft carrier [South China Morning Post], it is also seen to have sent an unambiguous message to the US when it allegedly practiced attacks on the U.S. territory of Guam as reported by Defense News, citing unnamed US military officials. China’s Defense Ministry has not yet reacted to the allegations [Defense News]. Furthermore, China has quietly undertaken more construction and reclamation in the South China Sea, recent satellite images show, and is likely to more powerfully reassert its claims over the waterway soon, regional diplomats and military officers say. Washington is struggling to counter China’s creeping domination of the area, and the issue is likely to come up during U.S. President Donald Trump’s visit to Asia, which begins this week [Reuters]. China’s assertive foreign policy should be read in the context of the Party’s historical mission to achieve “national rejuvenation” and for China’s leadership of the wider world in a global “New Era.” [The Diplomat]. However, it is important not to overlook risks and the very present possibility of Xi in general and his OBOR project in particular facing huge difficulties in the time to come. Many of the OBOR partner countries for instance are in unstable positions, have huge financial difficulties and are unlikely going to be readily able to safeguard Chinese investment or easily return profits on it [NY Books and Japan Times].
3 November 2017
China-ROK relations getting back to normal, while worries about North Korean nuclear program grow
After prolonged – and ultimately unsuccessful – political and economic warfare campaigns against the Republic of Korea to dissuade it from participating in a U.S. anti-missile defense program (THAAD) aimed at North Korean nuclear attack capabilities, China has begun taking steps to resume normal bilateral relations with South Korea. The Chinese Foreign Ministry stated Tuesday that both sides “agree to bring communication and cooperation in various fields back on the normal track as soon as possible” [Xinhua]. Regarding the North Korean nuclear threat, Michael Auslin argues that the world should worry more about the risk of a North Korean nuclear accident, even more than its threats to initiate nuclear war. Even if Pyongyang’s laboratories and factories are safe, weapons systems break down, age, and suffer immense problems. The author also suggests that the US will need to figure out how to ensure that the accidents and miscalculations of the cold war are not repeated in North Korea, with catastrophic consequences [The New York Review of Books]. Meanwhile, NATO’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg began visits to Japan and South Korea on Sunday. On his topic list: North Korea, and “everything from fighting terrorism to cooperation in cyber and maritime security”. Regarding China’s increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea, Stoltenberg said it is important for NATO to have dialogue with Beijing [Kyodo News].
3 November 2017
Taiwan: President calls for breakthrough with China, faces cool response
Days after the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) revealed its new generation of top leaders, Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen made a public speech on cross-strait relations, calling for a breakthrough with China. In a rare direct message from Tsai to the Chinese authorities, Tsai’s message was a clearer definition of how she views the 1992 Cross-Straits talks commonly termed the “1992 consensus” [The Diplomat]. Meanwhile, Tsai landed in Hawaii on Saturday en route to a visit to Taipei’s diplomatic allies in the Pacific, despite strong objections from China. Tsai is on a week-long trip to three Pacific allies – Tuvalu, the Solomon Islands and the Marshall Islands – via Honolulu and the US territory of Guam. U.S. President Trump is scheduled to visit Beijing in less than two weeks [South China Morning Post].
28 October 2017
No heir apparent as new top leadership unveiled at party congress
The Chinese Communist Party Congress has revealed the new leadership with Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang continuing their posts as party secretary general and premier respectively and 5 new members among whom no one is considered a potential successor of Xi as they all will be over retirement age at the next party congress. In addition to this silence on a possible heir to Xi Jinping, the decision to introduce his political thought into the constitution as well as the military reshuffle in which Xi promoted quite a number of his allies to high posts within the PLA confirm that Xi has been able to further consolidate his power and prepares to rule the country beyond the end of his second term in 2022.
28 October 2017
Big data meets Big Brother
China is advancing preparations to implement its large scale “Social Credit System” (SCS) project, a system of nation-wide rating, ranking and rewarding of citizens’ trustworthiness based on data collected from citizens’ online appearances and activities. Participation in the SCS is currently voluntary, but will be mandatory in 2020. What is according to official policy papers an attempt to enhance ‘sincerity’ within state and society, resembles Orwells ‘1984’ vision of ubiquitous state surveillance and public manipulation [Wired].
28 October 2017
Government looks at dropping all limits on birth control
Facing pressure on the pension system due to an ageing society, the Chinese government is considering to entirely giving up family planning restrictions. This move comes only two years after the long standing one-child policy had ended in 2015 and having two children has been allowed since 2016 [South China Morning Post].
28 October 2017
New detention system
The Chinese government has announced to introduce a new internal party disciplinary system which aims to end abuses of power in the current system with its practice of detaining in secret locations, with family members left unnotified about the reasons and the whereabouts of the detainee. The new system would provide improvements including stricter internal procedures, adequate food and rest for detainees, and a time limit of 90 days for detention, with another 90 day extension if approval is obtained [Hong Kong Free Press].
28 October 2017
Chinese foreign policy towards South Asia, Eurasia and East Asia
Being nuclear powers which account for almost half of the world population, the relations between China, India, and Pakistan build up one of the most tensest and explosive strategic configurations [China Policy Institute: Analysis 1]. Within this triangle, the strengthening of the Sino-Pakistani relations has put India under pressure to find strategies to counter China’s growing influence in South Asia [China Policy Institute: Analysis 2]. A latest example is New Delhi’s launching of a satellite program offering communication and meteorological data to its neighboring countries, such as Sri Lanka for which China had installed a satellite in 2012 and with which it has established strong economic and defense cooperation since 2015 [China Brief: The Jamestown Foundation].
The Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) with its members Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia is a core element in China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative as it not only secures China’s connection to Europe and provides economic opportunities due to the wealth of national resources in the EEU-region, but also stabilizes the relation to Russia as the first and foremost condition for the success of OBOR [East Asia Forum].
South Korea and China have signaled efforts to overcome their differences on the deployment of US anti-missile systems on South Korean soil to pave way to re-vitalize diplomatic relations. At the margins of the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM) Plus in the Philippines, the defense ministers of both countries met and had talks for the first time since 2 years [Channel News Asia].
28 October 2017
India: An old, new pivot in the Great Game
India is shifting from a mere fringe position in global politics to the role of a central and active player that aims to significantly shaping the new emerging Asian security order. As it seems to find itself relentlessly caught up in competition with China, the Modi administration advances its regional presence, connectivity and influence in all directions. Its multi-alignment approach includes aligned powers like the US, Australia and Japan, South Asia, and Southeast Asia while it also keeps good relations with its old ally Russia. An impressive line-up of projects to strengthen links within and to South and Southeast Asia is subject of the first article looking at a number of mega cross-border air and land connectivity projects and energy initiatives as just agreed in Bangladesh and generally aiming at countries like Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and Sri Lanka in South Asia as well as in the South East Asia with Japan as a key partner in this process [The Economic Times 1]. Arguably the most important element of the new Indian foreign policy assertiveness are the Indian-US ties. After US Defense Secretary Mattis has visited India last month, the recent Indian-US foreign minister meeting expressed the US acknowledgment of India as a “leading power”, a democracy and the US interest to enhance India’s status as a ‘major defense partner’. The ‘Major Defense Partner’ status that has been given by the Obama Administration provides for deeper defense cooperation including technology transfer which culminated last year in a crucial logistics defense pact that enables the countries’ military to use each other’s assets and bases for repair and replenishment of supplies. After Mattis’ recent talks on India’s role in Afghanistan and the issue of Pakistani support for Islamic terrorism which were now continued on the sidelines of the ASEAN defense ministers meeting in the Philippines, Tillerson and his Indian counterpart Sushma Swaraj touched on India’s remaining diplomatic presence in North Korea and its ties to Iran, while highlighting the mutual interests in expanding maritime cooperation and alternatives to China’s Belt and Road Initiative as already proceeded by India and Japan in form of the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor project. Tillerson also offered “the best” of its military technology to India with current military US-Indian cooperation projects including a deal about US Sea Guardian drones and a program on ‘Helicopter Operations from Ships other Than Aircraft Carriers’ (HOSTAC). The momentum of US-Indian relations which is likely to turn out to exert growing impact on the overall alignment of regional ordering is already affirmed by the much recent Japanese proposal to have top-level dialogues between Japan the US, India and Australia to promote free trade and defense cooperation. The 31st ASEAN and East Asia Summit in the second week of November which is expected to bring together US President Trump, Japanese Prime Minister Abe and Chinese President Xi will have to be carefully watched in this respect [The Christian Science Monitor, ABC News, The Economic Times 2]. While India faces its biggest national security challenge with Pakistan and China steadily growing closer, the US-Indian rapprochement is, however, both inevitable as complicated. While the democratic form of government and English as a common lingua franca are often highlighted as assets, there is a noteworthy Indian identity discourse stressing the superiority of Indian culture and its non-materialistic values against claimed degenerations of neo-liberal capitalism. Currently the issue manifests in a dispute between American free trade versus Indian health care interests [The Wire]. It has also been noted in India that the US will remain reliant on Pakistan for logistical support for its Afghan engagement and that the Trump administration – in contrast to Japan’s Prime Minister Abe – has refrained from any statement in support of India throughout its most serious confrontation with China in the recent Dokhlam stand-off [The Indian Express]. Central for the future of the US-Indian partnership will be the spaces for pursuing India’s national interest with the Afghan theater and India’s carefully cherished ties to Iran as an testing field. Crucial as the elephant in the room will be its ties to Russia. Celebrating 70 years of diplomatic ties between India and Russia, the Vice Chief of the Indian Air Force recently noteworthy stressed regarding military technology transfers that Russia’s offered “everything they have from the heart without any strings attached” and highlighted the scope for further deepening the military ties [The Economic Times 3]. In fact, Russia has provided the largest part of India’s heavy weaponry since times when the USA didn’t consider India as a noteworthy security partner. With the Indian Air Force planning to acquire a fleet of single engine fighter jets Russia will soon be invited to bid against Swedish Saab and US Lockheed Martin offers. Yet, while India’s Defense Production Secretary encourages Russian defense firms to come forward for entering into strategic partnerships with Indian companies for developing defense platforms, France and India are currently enhancing their defense cooperation. The visit of the French Defense Minister to Delhi last week was part of India’s attempt to bolster its strategic cooperation in defense with respect to maritime security in the Indian Ocean but also saw the French minister attending the foundation stone-laying ceremony of the Dassault-Reliance Aerospace manufacturing facility. Established under a joint venture in the wake of a Rafale fighter jets sale to India with some critical parts to be made in India for later assembly in France, the facility seems to be able to be developed to completely manufacture own Indian jets in the future. Generally, western weapons are more expensive than Russians and often come with less favorable conditions while Pakistan and China will remain major buyers of Russian weapons [The Economic Times 4].
28 October 2017
India´s Dangerous Taiwan Gambit
Following the redefinition of its previous “Look East” policy to an “Act East” policy after the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) takes shape as a major geopolitical move that is accompanied by the impressive Chinese advancement in the Indian Ocean region India continues its daring rapprochement with Taiwan. Under Modi who has always been ‘Taiwan friendly’, the bilateral economic relations are thriving with some Indian voices recommending to send an Indian defense attaché to Taipei. The development is in line with a policy to use China’s ‘core issues’ like Taiwan, the Dalai Lama, and the South China Sea as a strategic card that gains weight in context of the emerging quadrilateral and triangular coalitions with the United States, Australia, and Japan [The Diplomat].
28 October 2017
Pakistan: The Gwadar port project and Chinese security concerns
Amidst reports on growing security threats for Chinese diplomats in Pakistan caused by infiltrators of the East Turkmenistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) following the killing of two Chinese teachers in June and some worries for Chinese workers [The Times of India], the Chinese financed and executed enhancement of Pakistan’s strategically located Arabian Sea port of Gwadar into one of the world’s largest transit and transshipment cargo facilities represents a highly significant geopolitical move to open an alternative trade route to the streets of Malakka. The report compares the project to the Sri Lankan-Chinese Hambantota port project [Financial Times].
28 October 2017
ASEAN Defense Ministers Meetings
The ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM) and ASEAN Defense Minister Meeting- Plus have taken place in Manial this week. Whilst the agenda was expectedly broad, there was a clear focus on terrorism [The Diplomat]. Singapore, as next ASEAN chair, has vowed to keep the fight of violent extremism exemplified by the recent Marawi siege on top of the agenda [The Strait Times 1]. The terrorist threat is magnified by potentially radical fighters who return to their home countries from fighting in the Middle East as ISIS there is nearly defeated and keeps losing ground [The Strait Times 2]. The South China Sea was also on the agenda. There was agreement to keep working on a common Code of Conduct as well as a general openness by China, the US and Japan to commence naval exercises with ASEAN and to improve communications and work out a protocol for unplanned encounters at sea to reduce risk of conflict [Today Online and Bloomberg]. The full joint declaration can be found here [Singapore MINDEF].
28 October 2017
ASEAN countries: In between major powers
Further intensifying Vietnamese-Indian relations, the deputy foreign ministers of both countries met in Hanoi for strategic consultations on political and security issues. This meeting follows a number of high level visits and exchange in the recent past [Viet Nam News]. In the meantime, Singapore is hedging between the US and China. After a recent visit to China, Singapore’s PM is currently on a visit to Washington upon invitation by President Trump. Whilst business has unsurprisingly been the focal point of the trip, Singapore is trying to position itself neutral, cooperating with both China and the US [A Times]. Similarly, the Philippines – after hosting US Secretary of Defense for a routine visit at the sidelines of the ADMM [NPR] – are making headway in diversifying their defense co-operations. New deals have been inked with both Russia [PhilStar 1] and China [PhilStar2].
20 October 2017
A guide to the 19th Party Congress
With the Chinese leadership initiating the 19th Party congress this week, this detailed guide addresses the main questions China watchers are waiting to have answered. Among them are whether or not Xi’s thought will be enshrined in the constitution as such, or if and how he is looking to position himself for a possible third term beyond the customary 10 years of Chinese presidency [Trivium].
20 October 2017
Chinese development aid in comparative perspectives
A US research group, AidData, has published its research on Chinese development aid and how it compares to that of the United States. Interestingly, with much being said about China catching up with the US in terms of aid it gives across the globe, with for example cheap loans and debt forgiveness taken out of the equation and pure focus on official development assistance, Chinese aid amounts to only about one-fifth of that of the US [AidData].
20 October 2017
China-Taiwan relations: The role of the US
With Donald Trump’s first trip to China coming up, a Taiwanese official has raised the issue not to use Taiwan as a bargaining chip in US-China relations [The China Post]. From the congress in Beijing, strong words on Taiwan by Xi signal continuity in the PRC’s approach to the matter [Asia Times].
20 October 2017
U.S. intelligence sees China’s military expanding bases globally
US Intelligence sources point to a level of Chinese military modernization and expansion around the globe that increasingly poses risks for manifest conflict with US security interests with China seen to actively undermining US influence [bloomberg]. According to Rand corporation, major conflict between the US and China is unlikely imminent while there are plenty of flashpoints to watch demanding the US to keep itself ready for various scenarios [nextbigfuture].
20 October 2017
Why China and Russia are unlikely to maintain a long-term strategic alliance, NATO pressures Russia
Recent military exercises between the world’s second- and third-best funded armies from the Sea of Japan to the Baltic Sea showcased a budding military partnership and determination to challenge US domination on the high seas. China and Russia need each other in their quest for global influence amid rivalry with the US, and they share the world’s longest border. But, argues the author, this increaslingly close Sino-Russian military relationship may mask deepter divisions. They share little in common in terms of history, culture, religion and tradition, and they’ve fought periodically for more than 300 years. It is unlikely that the biggest powers in Eurasia can establish an outright and long-lasting strategic alliance, such as NATO. NATO, in the meantime, has launched a mission with new multinational forces in Romania as a counter to Russia’s influence. Whilst NATO and host country Romania state the mission’s aim is nothing but peace, Russia alleges it is an encirclement strategy against it and feels put under increased pressure [South China Morning Post] [Channel New Asia].
13 October 2017
The rising stars of China’s Communist Party
Starting on 18 October, China’s Communist Party will unveil its next generation of elite leaders when it meets for a congress that is held every five years. Except for President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang, five of the seven members of the party’s top body, the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), are set to retire later this year. Given the opaque nature of Chinese politics, it is tricky to say who will fill the vacancies, though it is certain that they will likely be those close to Xi. The BBC takes a look at the men widely expected to take over the reins of China’s ruling party [bbc].
13 October 2017
Chinese travellers are bringing back home lots of VPNs
In what could be a key indicator of the Chinese Communist Party’s efforts to create “harmonious society”, Chinese tourists going abroad often return home with a most cherished souvenir: VPNs. Virtual private networks (VPNs) are the most common way for Chinese internet users to bypass government internet censorship — the “Great Firewall,” that blocks access to many popular websites including Google and Facebook. Beijing views unfiltered internet content as a threat to national security, and Chinese President Xi Jinping stresses “cyber sovereignty”, a concept that every country has the right to stop unwanted information at its borders. Controls over China’s internet have intensified over the past few months, before the upcoming Communist Party congress [South China Morning Post].
13 October 2017
Heavy political gender imbalance
While China is catching up on gender equality in business and education, its political sphere starkly lags. Only a fourth of CCP memberships, a baseline requirement for political office holders in China, are held by women reducing even the pool of potential female leaders significantly. While some reshuffling is expected at the upcoming party congress, it will do little to change this [cfr].
13 October 2017
Party-led rule-by-law regime
An essential element of modernization theories is the assumption of the direct relation between democracy and rule of law on the one side and economic development on the other side, with the latter necessarily and ultimately leading the former. China clearly defies this assumption as the CCP appears to be more determined than ever before to establish its own version of the rule of law: that with ‘Chinese characteris-tics’ combining economic growth and one-party rule. And according to Susan Trevaskes, the party under Xi Jinping has been increasingly successful in popularizing the idea and image of the harmony and identity of rule of law, party rule and the people’s interests in which the legal system serves as an instrument to internally dis-cipline the party against behavior damaging na-tional interest and to suppress external dissent seen as threats to the party (East Asia Forum). A notable example in a string of party-internal dis-ciplining of high ranking party officials is the recent case of Sun Zhengcai, formerly tipped to elected member of the Politburo Standing Com-mittee at the upcoming National Party Congress. After being sacked in July as party chief of the city of Chongqing, an economically fast growing mega city in the southwest with a population of 30 Mio, he has now been dismissed from public office on grounds of serious violations of party discipline.
13 October 2017
Why China and Russia are unlikely to maintain a long-term strategic alliance, NATO pressures Russia
Recent military exercises between the world’s second- and third-best funded armies from the Sea of Japan to the Baltic Sea showcased a budding military partnership and determination to challenge US domination on the high seas. China and Russia need each other in their quest for global influence amid rivalry with the US, and they share the world’s longest border. But, argues the author, this increaslingly close Sino-Russian military relationship may mask deepter divisions. They share little in common in terms of history, culture, religion and tradition, and they’ve fought periodically for more than 300 years. It is unlikely that the biggest powers in Eurasia can establish an outright and long-lasting strategic alliance, such as NATO. NATO, in the meantime, has launched a mission with new multinational forces in Romania as a counter to Russia’s influence. Whilst NATO and host country Romania state the mission’s aim is nothing but peace, Russia alleges it is an encirclement strategy against it and feels put under increased pressure [Shouth China Morning Post] [Channel New Asia].
13 October 2017
Philippines: The art of hedging: Closer ties with China, Russia, and the US
The Philippines are hedging their bets. They are seen to be moving away from over-reliance on the US, whilst crucially not severing ties with its traditional major ally [Manila Bulletin]. China is more than ready to fill the gap, boosting aid and handing out free rifles [VOA News].
13 October 2017
China, US both using lawfare in the South China Sea
Lawfare, “a form of asymmetric warfare, consisting of using the legal system against an enemy, such as by damaging or delegitimizing them, tying up their time or winning a public relations victory”, is widely used by both the US and China, most prominently in the South China Sea. Whilst the US has been doing so for a long time, China sees the international norms and rule sets as set by the US and with its rise, it is increasingly less willing to simply follow the order it encounters. New frontiers, such as cyber or outer space are an interesting space to watch in this regard as the rules of the games there are only beginning to evolve. Related here, be sure to check out CPG’s annual conference next week (CPG) [Ipp Review] [cpg].
13 October 2017
Japan and China send sweet words, for now Beijing to watch Abe’s election gamble before rapprochement
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is taking steps to warm Sino-Japanese relations, coinciding with his dissolution of the lower house and call for elections on Oct. 22. Sino-Japanese relations have been strained since the autumn of 2012, primarily due to tensions over the disputed Senkaku Islands (called Diaoyu” by China). The author marvels at Abe’s apparent shift from “hard-liner toward China” and his expressed strong desire to further improve Sino-Japanese relations through top-level contacts. The author contends Abe has no choice by to “mend fences”, but that the same is true for China as well, with its increasing “tangled” diplomacy and increasing strains in its relations with the U.S. and many other countries. But the Xi-Abe rapprochement is a fragile one, and it is not clear it will survive October [asia.nikkei].
13 October 2017
What’s pushing Chinese high-speed train projects off the rails overseas?
China’s efforts to sell its Xi Jinping’s New Silk Road and related high-speed technology face serious obstacles around the world, from Thailand in Asia to Libya in Africa and Venezuela in South America. The reasons for the roadblocks include local regulations, high costs, political and economic volitility, and “lack of transparency” [South China Morning Post].
13 October 2017
Chinese and Indian stakes in Myanmar today
The volatility that is caused by the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar is viewed with some dismay by two other major powers that both have a long history with Myanmar and are currently competing for investment and influence there. Both have a long, if mixed relation with its neighbour whilst India’s interest has hugely increased since its 2014 “Act East” policy [The Daily Star].
6 October 2017
CCP’s 19th Party Congress
At the upcoming the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party – by far China’s most debated single political event – Xi Jinping’s re-election as General Secretary is widely consid-ered as secure. Uncertain, however, is how Xi will be dealing with the issue of the retirement age of 68 for top party positions, an in-official, non-binding party rule which however, has been adhered to since 2002. Observers speculate that Xi will push for a relaxation of this regulation as it would pave way for a possible third term for him in 2022 when he will be 69. Besides that, five out of the seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee, the very inner circle of power, would drop out [SupChina]. Among them is Wang Qishan, who turned 69 in July and who is Xi’s trusted right-hand man in the large scale anti-corruption campaign which has been crucial for securing the party’s legitimacy and Xi’s grip on power so far [South China Morning Post].
6 October 2017
China’s new censorship machine
China’s internet censorship policy and campaign continues to roll unabated and has in the mean-time established a domestic growth industry. Conservative estimates hold that there are more than 2 Mio. online content monitors, while companies increase their employee num-bers from 40 to 1000 within two years [Reuters]. Weibo, China’s most popular social media plat-form, recently announced its plan to hire 1000 online content supervisors who, according to job description, are supposed to fulfill a target report number of 200 pieces with contraband content per month [The Diplomat]. In another case of a foreign company meeting Beijing’s request for blocking access to user information and posts, Facebook made un-accessible pages of a Chi-nese fugitive who is accusing top Chinese offi-cials of corruption and against whom the Chi-nese authorities submitted a request for an Inter-pol red notice on bribery charges [South China Morning Post].
The Diplomat
6 October 2017
China’s new censorship machine
Could there be theaters of war in Asia?
According to a national security report of the Russian Defense Ministry, geopolitical tensions have risen to an extent that a military conflict between Russia and NATO countries appears possible (Asia Times). Against the background of a looming military clash in Asia, it is interesting to imagine possible scenarios (and the actors and their strategies) of such a clash by looking into the global war games the US Naval War College had developed in the 1970s and 1980s for that time (The National Interest). Currently, the two conflict spots in East Asia for which a military clash is thinkable are North Korea and Taiwan. The risk of a war is to be considered much more acute for the latter than for the former. One the one hand, Beijing views Taiwan much more decisive for her pursuit of regional hegemony than North Korea (Slate) and has already made concrete plans for an invasion of the island by 2020 (The Washington Free Beacon). One other hand, North Korea is believed to be rational enough to see that an attack on the USA is tantamount to suicide. In this light it is for the USA to consider abandoning the defence treaty with South Korea to fully free herself from the risk of war with North Korea, Doug Bandow writes.
6 October 2017
Rising contenders in Asia: India and China
Within Asia the rising powers India and China are competing for dominance manifest in efforts to assert own’s position vis-a-vis the other across the region and beyond. Military exercises in Djibouti (South China Morning Post I) and a research vessel’s month-long presence in the Pacific Ocean southeast of US territory Guam express China’s ambitions as global player once more. While the US considers the research expedition as directed towards the future build-up of a military base on the island country of Micronesia (South China Morning Post II), India is concerned about the conduct of the first live fire exercise at the Djibouti base. Besides increasing her presence in the region around the Indian Ocean, China continues to advance its influence in Southeast Asia, where Laos and Cambodia are China’s closest allies. However, their respective relation with China differs. While Laos appears to be savvy in navigating the tricky diplomatic waters and faces less risk of “over-reliance” on China, whereas the Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen has said his country is China’s “most trustworthy friend” (Myanmar Times). On the other side, two Indian Navy warships made a goodwill visit to the Philippines this week. The visit, a manifestation of PM Modi’s “Act East Policy”, was boost for bilateral ties and part of commemorations under way marking 25 years of partnership between India and ASEAN. The Indian ships sailed from to visit Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Philippines, South Korea, Japan, Brunei, and Russia (The Diplomat). Meanwhile, U.S. defence secretary Jim Mattis said that there was a strategic convergence, a “generational opportunity” between the two largest democracies in the world to work together, based on shared interests of peace, prosperity and stability in the region (Times of India I). Furthermore, during the six days long visit of India’s Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and Chief of the Naval Staff to Vietnam, both countries expressed their strong determination for intensify their strategic partnership and security cooperation (Vietnam News). This meeting comes at a time in which Vietnam is stepping up efforts to build up a robust self-defense on the country’s maritime features in the South China Sea (China Policy Institute: Analysis) while India tries to position itself a regional power to counter not only China’s strategic influence in Southeast Asia (Times of India II), but also its soft power and cultural influence (New York Times).
6 October 2017
Asia’s Maritime Order
The Philippines will begin important upgrades to its primary outpost in the disputed Spratly group in the South China Sea. The Armed Forces of the Philippines’ Modernization Program will finance the paving of an airstrip on the largest Philippine holding in the Spratly group, where China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan also have claims (The Diplomat). Regarding the exploration of oil and gas resources within disputed areas, China reemphasized its commitment to a lifting of a moratorium and a joint commercial development of the petroleum blocks (Manila Bulletin). At the same time, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte voiced rare praise for the United States, calling it an important security ally, and dismissing historic grievances and his slew of past tirades against Washington as “water under the bridge” (South China Morning Post). Australia, in the meanwhile, needs to shift the focus of military presence from the Middle East to Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific, if it wants to succeed in coping with emerging security challenges in Asia-Pacific and protect its direct strategic interests (The Australian).
29 September 2017
Military elite turnover amid military modernisation
Much like President Xi’s anti-corruption cam-paign, his military reform efforts do not stop at high ranking officials. The upcoming party con-gress could see a major reshuffle of military leaders with up to 83% of those military leaders who currently are members of the 18th Central Committee to be replaced [China-US Focus]. Xi’s professionalization of the army is widely perceived as a move towards a “Western-style joint command” [South China Morning Post].
29 September 2017
Stepping up security against Uighur militancy
China has greatly expanded its security presence in Urumqi, the capital city of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, China’s largest province by area but one of its poorest and least populated which is inhabited by Turkic Muslim Uighurs and Han Chinese. Amid increasing Uighur militance with alleged links to Islamist terrorist groups in the Middle East Beijing´s new governor, the local party secretary, who recently ruled in Tibet with an iron fist, made state security the most important source of employment, changed the capital´s outlook with razor wire fences and cameras, required all restaurants to play two propaganda songs every hour of the day and ordered residents to download a gov-ernment app that deletes unapproved applications and videos about forbidden topics like terrorism.
29 September 2017
Emboldened China wields its laws to silence critics from abroad
Lee’s apprehension is part of Beijing’s broad and successful campaign to suppress criticism worldwide. “China has been extending its clampdown — its choking of civil society — throughout the world, and often it is attempting this through official channels such as the U.N. or Interpol,” says Michael Caster, a rights cam-paigner. “Unfortunately, they’re very adept at doing it.” This article examines the world-wide suppression campaign in detail.
29 September 2017
China blocks WhatsApp, broadening online censorship
Beijing continues to disrupt or block foreign-owned social media sites in the run up to the Chinese Communist Party Congress on October 18. WhatsApp is the latest target, following China’s blocking of such social media favorites as Facebook and Instagram. Technology multi-nationals, heavily dependent on the Chinese market, have been reluctant to criticize Beijing for violation of its WTO and other agreements regarding freedom of data connectivity. The United States has opened a formal investigation into whether China is violating the intellectual property of American companies, but it is not clear if the scope of the investigation includes China’s blocking of products such as WhatsApp.
29 September 2017
China using Lee case as warning to NGOs: Wang Dan
Beijing prosecuted Taiwanese human rights campaigner Lee Ming-che to warn foreign NGOs operating within its borders to abide by its regulations, according to Wang Dan, an ex-iled leader of the 1989 Tienanmen Square protests. China has tightened laws governing for-eign NGOs in recent years, mandating extensive registration and reporting requirements. Foreign NGOs are having a hard time coping with the new laws, which gives the police a wide range of powers to question their foreign workers, inspect their offices, review documents, and even con-fiscate premises and assets. Lee, a Taiwan com-munity college teacher known for his prodemocracy and rights activism, disappeared under murky circumstances after entering China for talks with democracy advocates in March. Nearly 6 months later, Beijing tried and convicted him on a charge of “subversion of state power” in a court in Human Province.
29 September 2017
China and Southeast Asia ever closer: Different intensity and levels of cooperation – similar trend?
Cambodia: Amidst a global power struggle between two major powers in a multipolar world, Cambodia is hedging its bet but is leaning closer and closer to China. China is “backing up” Cambodian elites in power, invests heavily in the country and will further benefit from a “declining west” (Khmer Times). PRC investments are seen to meet the country’s needs more than other international banks and organisations and political realities in Cambodia today favour an embrace of China (ISEAS).
Malaysia: Malaysia-China ties have been deeping in recent years, they include arms-sales, investment, information-sharing and other diplomatic engagements. While some MPs in Malyasia are critical of this, the contrast between the treatment PM Najib experiences in China compared to his rather informal visit to the White House recently, is striking (Free Malaysia Today). Kuala Lumpur has also just deported 29 Uighurs who will now face prosecution in China (Strait Times).
Singapore: As ties between Singapore and China seem to be warming up again and with the Singaporean PM’s visit to China last week, some analysts see the end or at least suspension of the military training arrangement between Singapore and Taiwan called “Starlight Project”. The decade old cooperation has long been bothering China but is important to Singapore which has only very limited airspace (SCMP 1). Other analysts point to remaining differences likely to dominate the PRC-SP relationship, in particular the South China Sea (SCMP 2).
29 September 2017
China-owned port in Sri Lanka could alter trade routes
One of China’s largest state-owned companies, China Merchants Group, is in the final stages of purchasing a majority stake in loss-making deep water container port from Sri Lanka. Focusing on the strategic shift enabled by the purchase the article provides an optimistic outlook of how the Chinese OBOR’s grand strategy could significantly manifest at the small village of Hambantota which is seen as becoming the main Chinese-operated transshipment hub in the Indian Ocean adding to the port projects in Pakistani Gwadar and in Kenya and turning Hambantota port into the key Indian Ocean deep water port between Suez and East Asia. By itself evolving in a disruptive occurrence Hambantota is expected to reconfigure the large trade flows across the Asian sea lanes in India´s backyard. Noteworthy, the author also projects the possible impact if an inter-ocean ‘Thai canal’ across the isthmus of Southern Thailand would also be build by China which would re-route business away from Singapore and the Malacca Straits – notwithstanding the fact that the project is currently not discussed by the Thai government.
29 September 2017
China: New legal tactic in the South China Sea?
The Washington Free Beacon has recently put out a piece about a new legal tactic deployed by China replacing the 9-Dash-Line with the “Four Sha” concept. Whilst this sounds like big news, Lawfare has reacted with a more sober piece, putting the “new” developments into perspective.
29 September 2017
China forging military ties to expand its reach
Beijing has undertaken a wide range of military engagements, such as training exercises and arms sales, to help position itself as a regional counterweight to the United States. China’s military interaction with ASEAN countries in recent years has been particularly striking (SCMP). This is reflected by the ‘East Asia Forum’ focus on China’s global arms export strategy (EAF). The article analyses the success and strategic rationale of China’s arms exports which make the country the world’s third biggest arms exporter. Raised technological sophistication combined with relatively low procurement cost linked to a non-interference policy to arms sales that is keeping a customer’s political, military and human rights record outside the contractual arrangements make the Chinese products attractive. Primary aim of the arms exports is, however, not export revenue the authors argue but longer-term geo-political and strategic influence. As a part of an encompassing strategy including other means such as foreign aid, investment and overseas educational programs, arms exports lever client-state relationships, bolster Beijing’s influence and arm neighboring states to contain rivals like India.
29 September 2017
Pakistan-Russia-China military cooperation
A two-week long joint counterterrorism exercise between the special forces of Pakistan and Russia began as another sign of the growing military cooperation between the two countries in recent years with Russia having delivered 4 Mi-35 gunship helicopters to Pakistan in August and Islamabad having shown interest in purchasing the S-400 Russian missile defense system. Meanwhile the air forces of China and Pakistan have held joint training exercises in northwest China for the sixth time after their launch in 2011 (first link), and the joint Sino-Russian Baltic Sea Drill has been conducted as part of the countries’ “constantly expanding” maritime cooperation exercises. Russia and China have conducted these exercises regularly since 2012, with important practical and symbolic benefits countering Western efforts at isolation with Beijing displaying its new global military potential and increasing its relatively nascent operational skills at sea.
29 September 2017
Australia, Japan and India advance to the South China Sea
Three major countries in Asia Pacific – Australia, Japan and India – are expected to beef up their naval presence in the South China Sea amid the Philippine’s softening sovereignty stance in the disputed waters collaborating with China in oil and gas exploration and accepting the increasing presence of Chinese vessels within its exclusive economic zone. While India and Japan foster ties with Vietnam, Australia is seeking closer relations to Indonesia in the joint strategy to contain Chinese influence.
22 September 2017
Ruling the country by internal party regula-tions
Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, the Chinese Communist Party has increasingly made use of internal party rules and regulations to formulate policies and govern the country. In many cases these regulations are in tension with, if not in contradiction to, state laws. This trend clearly signals the claim of the party to be superior in guarding the development of the country than the state.
22 September 2017
New regulations forcing the country’s online ideas market out of business
On 1 October two new internet related regula-tions of China’s Cyberspace Administration will enter into force. In line with the Cyber Security Law of 1 June these regulations – among them the requirement to register for online forums with the user’s real name and a ‘first-prove-then-post’ obligation of providers – manifest an un-precedented level of internet control in China.
22 September 2017
New head of Chinese military equipment development program
With the promotion of Central Military Com-mission member and space official Lieutenant General Li Shangfu to the post of the head of the PLA’s equipment development program Presi-dent Xi Jinping continues to fill military leadership positions with younger and trusted allies.
22 September 2017
Work on mission to Mars ‘well underway’
The top architect of China’s Mars exploration program – hailed as symbol of the country’s global rise – expressed at the Beijing Interna-tional Forum on Lunar and Deep-space Exploration confidence in launching China’s mars mission in 2020 as scheduled.
22 September 2017
China: Western contempt for China turns to panic
Facing China’s continued economic progress and power, longstanding Western attitudes of disdain towards Chinese economic products and performance have given way to fear of the ongoing expansion of Chinese influence worldwide.
22 September 2017
Geopolitics, democracy and India-Japan security cooperation
Arguing against the trend of an autocratic redux in Asia, the author paints a more complex picture and describes dynamics strengthening democracy in the region citing for instance Hong Kong’s and Taiwan’s reactions to a more assertive China and referring a deepening India-Japan security cooperation.
22 September 2017
India-China relations: After the Doklam stand-off and the BRICS-Summit – tensions are far from over
While the recent BRICS-Summit turned out as a major factor in resolving the Doklam stand-off, India and China will continue to find themselves at odds over numerous issues (Quartz). As an example: China will likely finish a huge hydro-power project in the disputed area of Kashmir way ahead of schedule. The project is part of the Pakistan economic corridor. China presses ahead: “The Belt and Road initiative cannot be delayed or sidetracked by the territorial disputes.” Another example of likely further tension is a strategically important China-Nepal highway (Hindustan Times) built by China. Demographics may turn the tables in the long run in India’s favour however (The Strait Times II). Last, but not least India’s Army Chief of Staff has spoken twice publicly on India’s ability to wage a two-front war against China and Pakistan. Gautam Sen, a retired Indian defence accounts officer, considers possible strategic reasons of such a statement as well as the substance of its claim. The author argues that short-term posturing may be detrimental to India’s long-term interests (Mainstream Weekly).
22 September 2017
India-China relations: After the Doklam stand-off and the BRICS-Summit – tensions are far from over
While the recent BRICS-Summit turned out as a major factor in resolving the Doklam stand-off, India and China will continue to find themselves at odds over numerous issues (Quartz). As an example: China will likely finish a huge hydro-power project in the disputed area of Kashmir way ahead of schedule. The project is part of the Pakistan economic corridor. China presses ahead: “The Belt and Road initiative cannot be delayed or sidetracked by the territorial disputes.” Another example of likely further tension is a strategically important China-Nepal highway (Hindustan Times) built by China. Demographics may turn the tables in the long run in India’s favour however (The Strait Times II). Last, but not least India’s Army Chief of Staff has spoken twice publicly on India’s ability to wage a two-front war against China and Pakistan. Gautam Sen, a retired Indian defence accounts officer, considers possible strategic reasons of such a statement as well as the substance of its claim. The author argues that short-term posturing may be detrimental to India’s long-term interests (Mainstream Weekly).
22 September 2017
China-Russia relations: Sino-Russian military drills
Two joint military exercises of the Chinese and Russian navy in the Baltic Sea (China Policy Institute: Analysis) and near North Korea (South China Morning Post) since July reflect the increasing security cooperation between the two countries.
22 September 2017
China-Myanmar relations: Beijing signals further support for Myanmar as it seeks to increase its influence
China has opened a diplomatic liaison office in Myanmar’s official capital – Naypyidaw – while most other countries’ missions have not yet left Yangon (SCMP). The move´s timing in the middle of the latest Rohingya crisis is hardly coincidence showing continuous support for the regime amid wide-spread international condemnation (Quartz).
22 September 2017
China-Taiwan relations: China’s ‘United Front’ seeks to undermine U.S. support for Taiwan
China employs a vast, shadowy web of “United Front” organizations for its propaganda and influence operations abroad. This article examines this web that China has created to undermine U.S. support for Taiwan, how this web evades or ignores U.S. law, and steps that can be taken to expose the web and force its compliance with U.S. law.
22 September 2017
China-Taiwan relations: China’s ‘United Front’ seeks to undermine U.S. support for Taiwan
China employs a vast, shadowy web of “United Front” organizations for its propaganda and influence operations abroad. This article examines this web that China has created to undermine U.S. support for Taiwan, how this web evades or ignores U.S. law, and steps that can be taken to expose the web and force its compliance with U.S. law.
22 September 2017
China-ASEAN relations: One Belt, One Road
While China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative is generally welcome by ASEAN states for its promise of economic development, it is in China’s hands to dispel fears of expansionist intentions behind OBOR. Otherwise, the countries of this region will remain wary of this grand strategy of joint economic development and China will not gain the expected results of cooperation and interdependence, Munmun Majumdar writes (China Policy Institute: Analysis).
22 September 2017
Japan-China relations: Government builds firing range, ups coastguard to fend off Chinese ships
Japan continues to incrementally increase its Coast Guard logistics support and training capabilities across its Southwest Islands in Okinawa Prefecture, in response to vastly increased incursions by Chinese civilian and government vessels in waters it claims as sovereign. A new training range and the four-fold increase in Coast Guard vessels on Miyakojima will help Japan’s maritime law enforcement efforts against fleets of Chinese vessels that currently dwarf Japan’s three Coast Guard ships tasked with protecting waters that include the contested Senkaku Islands.
22 September 2017
Japan-India relations: Deepening defence ties
Japan’s Prime Minister Abe and India’s Prime Minister deepened defense relations between Asia’s second and third largest economies in a recent meeting in India, as both leaders eye balancing China as the dominant Asian power. Abe’s visit comes days after New Delhi and Beijing agreed to end the longest and most serious military confrontation along their shared and contested border in decades, a dispute that had raised worries of a broader conflict between the Asian giants. In a lengthy joint statement, India and Japan said deepening security links is paramount.
15 September 2017
Tightening the screws on religious freedom for fear of foreign infiltration and extremism
Chinese officials double down on religious free-doms and as they fear foreign influences aiming at dividing the country via religion. New, stricter rules have been past to regulate religious practices throughout the country [Reuters] whilst a member of the Muslim Hui minority has been sentenced to two years in prison for teaching Is-lam online [CBS].
15 September 2017
Taiwanese rights activist pleads guilty to sub-version in China’s mainland
A Taiwanese non-profit worker in China has been prosecuted under the new NGO law that declares it illegal for NGOs to endanger national security, ethnic unity and allows for tight control of NGOs operating in China. He pleaded guilty to the charges brought against him.
15 September 2017
China: China-born New Zealand MP probed by spy agency
An MP for New Zeeland’s ruling National Party has been investigated by New Zeeland’s intelligence agency for alleged ties to Chinese military intelligence based on his education in China at facilities known to produce military intelligence officers.
15 September 2017
Thailand: The Thai canal that could link the Indian and the Pacific Ocean
European business leaders have joined the Chinese and a Thai lobby in urging the construction of a ship canal through the Isthmus of Kra known as the Thai Canal that could be of a geopolitical impact not unlike those of the Suez and Panama canal bypassing the narrow, piracy-prone and strategically sensitive Strait of Malacca, the world’s busiest trade route, which links East Asia with the oil fields of the Middle East and major markets in Europe, Africa and India. While there is no sign of the Thai government in favor of the project it could change the balances of power in the region with direct consequences for the new emerging security order in Asia.
15 September 2017
South China Sea: Indonesia´s growing assertiveness
The first article comments on Indonesia´s increasingly assertive posture in the South China Sea and its implications. After three maritime skirmishes in 2016 and Indonesia having renamed a part of the disputed waters as Natuna Sea the country is building up its military presence around the Natuna Islands despite the fact that China is one of Indonesia´s biggest investors and trading partners (Today). The development expresses the declared policy of Indonesia´s President “Jokowi” to transform his country into a maritime power but also fits in a general trend of mutual assertiveness in the disputed waters (US Department of Defense). At the same time, Indonesia is enhancing its military training capabilities in the context of its participation in the annual US organized bilateral CARAT military exercise aiming at improving maritime interoperability of US partners and allies (Jakarta Globe).
15 September 2017
Indonesia & China: The Sea between
The article provides some historic background on the bilateral relation between China and Indonesia amidst growing tension in the South China Sea. It juxtaposes historic ideas of a common cultural space in Asia and the “firm” national borders today.
15 September 2017
Japan: PM Abe seeks to upgrade security talks with India amid China muscle-flexing
Japanese PM Abe is looking to upgrade the so-called two-plus-two framework between his country and India during his trip there this week to ministerial-level talk. Thus far, India has been reluctant to upgrade the talks but with China growing increasingly assertive, Japan feels it could have some momentum.
15 September 2017
China and the fear of organised religion
This article explores where Chinese Islamophobia comes from and whether it is organically grown or merely an “import” from the West. Turns out many factors, such as Han chauvinism, the CCP and the “guided” public discourse all play a role.
7 September 2017
12,000 officials disciplined and 18,000 companies punished in China’s crackdown against pollution
Unprecedented in extent and weight, inspection measures conducted by the Ministry of Envi-ronmental Protection have led to the punishment of 12000 officials and 18000 companies across China for lax enforcement of environmental protection laws.
7 September 2017
‘Overseas Chinese Affairs Office’ deputy removed from his post
With the removal of the deputy head of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council, Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign against high ranking bureaucrats continues unabated, now expanding to Macau and Hong Kong.
7 September 2017
Beijing Reins
Within three years after a surge of civil protest by the pro-democracy Umbrella Movement Bei-jing has managed to gain control of all three branches of power in Hong Kong putting the city under the Communist Party’s direct rule, in contradiction the model of ‘one country, two sys-tems’ guaranteed by the Hong Kong Basic Law.
7 September 2017
Why did China invite Thailand to the BRICS party?
Thailand was invited to attend a meeting of the BRICS countries in Beijing. Analysts see China’s invitation as returning a favour – Bangkok is its all weather ally and has helped China navigate its territorial disputes with neighbours in the South China Sea – and as a signal of Thailand’s still sound position in the global economy (South China Morning Post). However, there are also voices suggesting that Thailand may have to reevaluate its strategic relationship with China (Bangkok Post).
7 September 2017
The Belt and Road to China-based globalization
China’s One Belt, One Road Initiative must not be understood only in economic terms but as nothing less than the launching of a China-based globalization with significant ramifications in the field of geo-strategy and geopolitics, especially for India in the wake of a intensifying China-Pakistan relationship, Colin Mackerras writes.
7 September 2017
China’s Indian Ocean power play
The recent establishment of China’s military base in Djibouti was the start of a foreseeable bigger military presence in the Indian Ocean. Will the region become the next conflict spot between China, India and the US?
7 September 2017
China’s ‘innovative and pragmatic’ foreign aid
Since Deng’s Xiao Ping’s opening of the country, China has transformed from a country that was shaped by globalization into a country that is shaping globalization with huge investments in foreign aid projects and programs, Lauren Johnston and Marina Rudyak write.
7 September 2017
China ‘shoots down incoming missiles’ during exercise over waters close to North Korea
Only two days after North Korea’s latest nuclear test on Sunday, China’s military conducted the shot down of simulated missiles in the Bohai Bay. Analysts see in this exercise a warning not only against Pyongyang, but against the USA, too.
7 September 2017
What not to learn from Doklam
As future crises between India and China, or China and other powers, cannot be ruled out, it is time to reflect on the recent China-India stand-off. The first link describes what lessons not to draw from its resolution, whereas the second article argues India has not “won” this conflict. The third article describes however, how the resolution of the conflict could strengthen India’s hand in Asia.
7 September 2017
Trump’s posturing on Pakistan is a gift to China
Calling out Pakistan as a safe-haven for terrorists and putting pressure on the government could aid Pakistan-China relations. China has long standing relations with the South Asian nation and their ties grow closer – especially since the beginning of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor in 2015.
7 September 2017
South China Sea: As world watches Kim, China quietly builds South China Sea clout
Whilst Donald Trump’s America alongside much of the world’s media attention is focusing on North Korea, China keeps advancing its interests in the South China Sea. Some observers perceive that already China is slowly filling a power vacuum left behind by the United States in the area.
7 September 2017
South China Sea: Vietnam Government slams China over military drills in South China Sea
Hanoi has condemned a military exercise of China in the Paracels Archipelago as a violation of Vietnam’s sovereignty, reflecting the ongoing tensions between the two countries over the South China Sea.
31 August 2017
Removing barriers to Xi’s third term
Discussions within the Chinese Communist Party about a change of the retirement age can be seen as an effort to pave the way for a third term of Xi Jinping who would be 69 years old in 2022. The current guidelines of the Party deter-mine the retirement age at 68.
31 August 2017
Universities tighten ideological con-trol/Online posts only after real-name regis-tration
Reflecting ongoing efforts of the Chinese gov-ernment to increase control in state and society, the Communist Party Central Commission for Discipline Inspection has ordered ideological inspection visits in leading universities across the country. As a reaction, some universities have already established departments in charge of monitoring and evaluating political thinking of their teaching staff. In a related de-velopment, China’s cyber security law, in force since June, requires internet users from October on to register with their real names to be able to post comments online.
31 August 2017
What type of Southeast Asian order will China accept
A politically unified and neutral Southeast Asia is the most preferred form of this regional entity for China in her struggle with the USA for dominance in Asia, NUS Professor Huang Jing writes.
31 August 2017
Cross-Straits relations and the resurgence of “Martial Reunification”
Because of constraining factors on international level, national level and leadership level, cross-straits unification by military means is not a strategic choice for Beijing, Derek Ye Xiao Di writes. However, China might be compelled to enforce martial reunification if pro-independence forces within the green camp in Taiwan would prevail over president Tsai Ing-wen.
31 August 2017
Malaysia-China ties: A rosy look
In an interview on Malaysian-Chinese relations China’s Ambassador to Malaysia gives his views on the country’s bilateral ties highlighting the crucial economic relations with China being Malaysia’s most important trading partner and China heavily investing in recent years in Malaysia as one of the first country’s having embraced OBOR in the region.
31 August 2017
India and China reached an agreement – border dispute resolved
China claims victory over India in Himalayan border row. The border triangle in the Himalayan between China, India and Buthan very often led to conflicts. Now India and China have agreed to end a month-long military stand-off at a disputed border area in the Himalayas, with Indian troop already beginning to pull out, officials say.
31 August 2017
China – Pakistan military commanders hold meeting in Tajikistan
General Li Zuocheng, chief of the Joint Staff Department under the Central Military Commission (CMC), met with Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff General Qamar Javed Bajwa in Dushanbe and pledged to further improve bilateral ties, the Chinese Defence Ministry reports.
24 August 2017
Tens of thousands protest in Hong Kong over jailing of democracy activists
Tens of thousands of people took to the streets of Hong Kong on Sunday to protest against the jail-ing of three young democracy activists with many questioning the independence of the Chinese-ruled city’s judiciary. The three have been jailed for six to eight months last week for unlawful assembly.
24 August 2017
China’s deepening institutional decay
Short before the election of the new leadership at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China it is safe to say that Party General Secretary Xi Jinping has achieved two things during his term of office. This is first, the approval of his second term, and second, the successful push for a shift from the institutionalized rule of an elite group following the Deng reform era to a much more personalized rule of one man.
24 August 2017
Managing the State: Social Credit, Surveillance and the CCP’s Plan for China
The release of the Artificial Intelligence White Paper of the Chinese government reveals the latest plan of the party leadership to integrate artificial intelligence more decisively into the established system of control over party, state and society to secure the rule of the Chinese Communist Party.
24 August 2017
Video: Prominent Chinese rights activist ‘confesses’ to inciting subversion of state power
Jiang Tianyong, a prominent cause lawyer with a record of defending persecuted Chinese human rights advocates in politically sensitive cases, stood trial for charges of subversion of state power where he confessed.
18 August 2017
China: Xinjiang’s police hiring binge comes from party boss’s Tibet playbook
China’s northwestern border province Xinjiang has seen an exponential growth in security re-lated job-offers in the past two years, reflecting increasing police presence and surveillance in the region.
11 August 2017
What to expect from Xi Jinping’s Communist Party congress power play
The 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, upcoming in fall, will end up in nothing else but a further re-enforcement of President and Party General Secretary Xi Jinping as he has managed through his anti-corruption campaigns and reshuffle rounds to secure the rise of his men to power in the election of the new leader at the Congress.
4 August 2017
12 Regions of China: Why the Center Still Reigns Supreme
China’s regions have always been seen as a po-tential threat to the unity of the country. Today, however, modern technologies of transportation and communications as well as effective policies of the state governing the regions will ensure that the center will remain politically unchallenged.
4 August 2017
After Fall of Chongqing Party Boss, Chinese Officials Clamor to Demonstrate Loyalty
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s signature anti-corruption campaign continues to make major headlines. It has been argued that the campaign significantly strengthens Xi’s hand, which seems all the more important with the crucial party congress coming up this fall. Former Chongqing party boss and successor of Bo Xilai, who was sentenced under corruption charges in 2013, Sun Zhengcai was put under investigation for “severe violations of discipline”. In the aftermath, many party officials rally around Xi.
27 July 2017
Keeping China’s Soundscape in Check: Cen-sorship in Chinese Popular Music
While basically effective, the Chinese govern-ment’s heightened efforts to control the print and online circulation of the music songs sometimes bear unintended results [China Policy Institute Analysis].
27 July 2017
Bleak Outlook: Millions of Rural Chinese Children ‘Left Behind’
As a consequence of labor migration in the wake of China’s economic transformation 10 million children in rural areas are growing up without their parents at their side seeing them only once a year [The News Lens].
27 July 2017
Chinese hard power: The PLA Air Force’s “Silver-Bullet” Bomber Force
In recent years, significant efforts and reforms have been undertaken by the Chinese govern-ment to transform the People’s Liberation Army Air Force from a defensive force to one which is able to conduct offensive operations, too [The Jamestown Foundation: China Brief].
27 July 2017
Sikkim standoff: India must counter aggressive China
The military standoff in Sikkim between India and China has been ongoing for over a month. India’s troops last month stopped China from building a road in the disputed region of Dok-lam. The road was seen as a geopolitical risk due to its close proximity to India’s “Chicken’s Neck”. China has made the pullback of Indian troops the only condition for dialogue, while In-dia maintains that it is on the right side and that the world is supporting its actions [The Indian Express].
27 July 2017
China’s defense ministry demands India withdraw troops from Doklam area
China is demanding India to withdraw its troops from the Doklam area and complains that India is in violation of basic principles of international law [China Daily].
27 July 2017
China will protect border with India ‘at all costs’
In the dispute between China and India about the construction project in the area of Doklam Bei-jing has voiced in highly assertive tone the legal-ity of its road building [South China Morning Post].
27 July 2017
Alarming Escalation in the South China Sea: China Threatens Force if Vietnam Continues Oil Exploration in Spratlys
China’s displays assertiveness in reaction to gas and oil-drilling activities of Viet Nam in the South China Sea [The Diplomat].
27 July 2017
Let’s be clear: China would call America’s bluff in the South China Sea
White argues that the U.S. is not prepared to go to war over South China Sea territorial disputes. He believes China “would call America’s bluff” if Washington adopted a more aggressive strat-egy in the South China Sea [The Interpreter].
27 July 2017
Beijing sees joint energy venture with Manila as a ‘model’ for resolving South China Sea disputes
China and the Philippines have agreed to work-ing out a plan of a joint energy project in the South China Sea. In the eyes of Beijing this could be a model also for other claimant coun-tries to follow [South China Morning Post].
27 July 2017
China backs joint energy development with Philippines in South China Sea, urges Asean to reject outside interference
China has shown some willingness in joint en-ergy ventures with the Philippines in the South China Sea where the two countries claims over-lap. Joint Development Zones have long been discussed as a possibility to resolve some of the crises in the SCS [The Straits Times].
27 July 2017
EU–China relations in the Trump era
Against Donald Trump’s rejection of multilater-alism as a central element of US American for-eign policy, the EU-China relationship will play a vital role in tackling challenges global govern-ance is facing [East Asia Forum].
27 July 2017
US-China cooperation on North Korea re-mains critical
Indispensible for a resolution of the North Ko-rean crisis is an effective cooperation between the USA and China. Detrimental to that, how-ever, is the recent cooling down of the countries’ relations against the background of navy opera-tions in the South China Sea and arms sales to Taiwan [East Asia Forum].
27 July 2017
ICYM: What’s the Future of Sino-Palestinian Relations?
Albeit a long history of supporting Palestine, China becomes more visible in the Israel-Palestine conflict. Another sign of China’s preparations to become a more active player in the world [The Pavlovic]?
21 July 2017
Assessing the South China Sea Arbitral Award after One Year: Why China Won and the U.S. is Losing
A year after the PCA ruling on the South China Sea, it looks as though the PRC has turned a le-gal loss into a political victory. Nations who have an interest in upholding the ruling have thus far failed to exploit it to their advantage, in particular with regards to reputational costs that could have arguably been imposed upon the PRC [LAWFARE].
21 July 2017
Political Background: Xi Jinping and China’s Traditionalist Restoration
In an effort to harmonize contemporary national consciousness with traditional Chinese values, President Xi Jinping has been engaging in a tre-mendous project of reviving Chinese culture and tradition [The Jamestown Foundation: China Brief].
21 July 2017
Reshaping China’s military: 10 Chinese mili-tary milestones as Xi Jinping overhauls the People’s Liberation Army
Since 2015 major steps have been taken to re-shape China’s military and make it a modern army [South China Morning Post].
21 July 2017
China’s Draft on Securing ‘Critical Information Infrastructure’
In the context of the recent cyber security law, Chinese authorities have issued further draft regulations on protecting “Critical Information Infrastructure”. Though unlikely to be the final version of the regulations, the document indicates far reaching scope and significant implications for businesses and network operators. In addition to the article, the authors have also translated the draft regulation here [New America].
21 July 2017
Human Rights: “Penetrating Law Into the Walls of Chinese Detention Centers”
China’s Ministry of Public Security has released the draft law on detention centers [CPI Analysis].
21 July 2017
China’s economic rebalancing act is finally starting to pay off
China’s economic performance in the first half of 2017 shows signs of a model of sustainable growth being achievable in China [South China Morning Post].
16 July 2017
Dutertismo and the West Philippine Sea: Year One
Despite its apparent benefits, Duterte’s policy has not generated any assurance that China will not impose itself and its pre-emptive claim over waters and resources that legally pertain to the Philippines [Rappler].
16 July 2017
Why Won’t China Help With North Korea? Remember 1956
The international community can’t rely on China to tighten the noose around Kim Jong-un’s neck. Historical lessons show that Xi has no desire to “help” America with North Korea [China File].
16 July 2017
Isolated, tortured and mentally scarred … the plight of China’s human rights lawyers two years after ‘709 crackdown’
Two years after the “709 crackdown”, Chinese Human Rights lawyers are struggling and whilst the President speaks of rule of law, they are fac-ing a different reality [South China Morning Post].
16 July 2017
China’s biggest ally in the South China Sea? A volcano in the Philippines
How the eruption of Mount Pinatubo in 1991 led to the closing of two U.S. naval bases, facilitat-ing Chinese advancement in the South China Sea [Quartz].
16 July 2017
China sends troops to first overseas naval base in Djibouti
Military personnel have been sent to China’s first overseas naval base in Djibouti in the Horn of Africa, triggering worries in India [South China Morning Post].
7 July 2017
Beijing urges Asia security framework
China’s President Xi Jinping has invited 300 delegates to the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) where the need for a common Asian security framework was discussed. Led by Xi, delegates elaborated on how such a framework could de-velop and how it ties in with the China led BRI [China Daily].
7 July 2017
China passes tough new intelligence law
China has passed a new intelligence law which critics fear is purposely vaguely formulated. The law for example allows for people suspected of leaking or obstructing national intelligence work to be detained for 15 days and charged with a crime if appropriate [Reuters].
7 July 2017
U.S. Navy Patrols Near Disputed Island in South China Sea
US conducts back-to-back sea control close to China controlled islands in the SCS which China described as a “serious provocation”. Timing is important after Trump is supposedly growing more impatient with Beijing on the issue of North Korea and just ahead of the G 20 summit in Hamburg. It also comes just after Beijing had voiced concerns regarding fresh US-Taiwan arms sales and the issue of US ships making port calls there [The Wall Street Journal].
30 June 2017
Waiting in the Wings: PLAAF General Yi Xiaoguang
Will General Yi Xiaoguang be the next leader of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force at the 19th Party Congress in autumn this year? Look-ing at this professional background and career path, he is the most likely candidate.
30 June 2017
Is a New China-Vietnam Maritime Crisis Brewing in the South China Sea?
The long-planned Vietnam-China 4th Border Defense Friendly Exchange originally scheduled for 20-22 June was abruptly cancelled over dif-ferences pertaining to Vietnamese oil drilling in the South China Sea.
22 June 2017
Xi Jinping’s Marco Polo Strategy
Last month, Chinese President Xi Jinping pre-sided over a heavily orchestrated ‘Belt and Road’ forum in Beijing. The two-day event at-tracted 29 heads of state, including Russia’s Vladimir Putin, and 1,200 delegates…
22 June 2017
China’s Nuclear Weapons R&D Attains Highest Level
China’s nuclear weapons research and develop-ment has attained the world’s most advanced level although the country’s nuclear weapons stockpile is small, experts said Sunday, one day after the 50th anniversary of the country’s first test of a hydrogen bomb.
22 June 2017
Hong Kong’s PLA Garrison no Longer just Symbolic, top Brass say
The People’s Liberation Army has signalled that its Hong Kong garrison is no longer just a sover-eign symbol but a combat-ready force that could demonstrate China’s military might.