

# **Combating Police Corruption in Singapore: Lessons for Thailand**

**Jon S.T. Quah, Ph.D.**  
**Anti-Corruption Consultant, Singapore**  
**Retired Professor of Political Science**  
**National University of Singapore**  
**Email: [jonstquah@gmail.com](mailto:jonstquah@gmail.com)**

**Presentation at the Conference on “Good Policing  
and Police Reform in Thai and International  
Perspectives” at CPG, Faculty of Law, Thammasat  
University, Bangkok, December 4, 2017**

***“A policeman’s first obligation is to be responsible to the needs of the community he serves. ... The problem is that the atmosphere does not yet exist in which an honest police officer can act without fear of ridicule or reprisal from fellow officers. We create an atmosphere in which the honest officer fears the dishonest officer, and not the other way around.”***

**Frank Serpico, Retired New York Police Detective**

**(<https://www.americanswhotellthetruth.org/portraits/frank-serpico>)**

# Outline of Presentation

- 1. Definition and Types of Police Corruption**
- 2. Causes of Police Corruption in Colonial Singapore**
- 3. Opium Hijacking Scandal and CPIB's Formation**
- 4. Police Reforms in Singapore**
- 5. Policy Contexts of Singapore and Thailand**
- 6. Five Lessons for Thailand**
- 7. Conclusion**

## **1.1 Definition of Police Corruption**

**Julian Roebuck and Thomas Barker define police corruption as “any type of proscribed behaviour engaged in by a law enforcement officer who receives or expects to receive, by virtue of his official position, an actual or potential unauthorised material reward or gain.”**

**Source: Julian Roebuck and Thomas Barker, “A Typology of Police Corruption,” in Ronald L. Akers and Edward Sagarin (eds.), *Crime Prevention and Social Control* (New York: Praeger, 1974), p. 118.**

## 1.3 Eight Types of Police Corruption

Type	Definition
Corruption of authority	When a policeman receives unauthorised material gain from his position without violating the law
Kickbacks	Goods, services or money accepted by police officers from businessmen as reward for referring business
Opportunistic theft	Acts of confiscating money, merchandise or other property by police officers when performing duties
Shakedowns	When policemen witness or are aware of criminal violations and accept bribes for not making arrests
Protection for illegal activities	Police officers protect owners of gambling, narcotics and prostitution operations in return for payment
The fix	Quashing of prosecution proceedings or traffic tickets by police officers to avoid court action for offenders
Direct criminal activities	Involvement of police officers in burglary and robbery
Internal payoff	When police officers buy, barter or sell work assignments, promotions, etc., from or to their colleagues

Source: Roebuck and Barker (1974): 119-125.

## 2.1 Police Corruption in Colonial Singapore

Table 1: Reported Cases of Police Corruption in Singapore, 1845-1921

Form	No.	Percentage
Bribery	109	63.4%
Direct criminal activities	42	24.4%
Opportunistic theft	10	5.8%
Corruption of authority	9	5.2%
Protection of illegal activities	2	1.2%
Total	172	100%

Source: Compiled from *Straits Times*, 1845-1921, quoted in Jon S.T. Quah, "Police Corruption in Singapore: An Analysis of its Forms, Extent and Causes," *Singapore Police Journal*, 10 (1) (January 1979), p. 24.

## 2.2 Causes of Police Corruption in Colonial Singapore

### ❑ Low salaries of police officers

Table 2: Monthly Salary in Singapore Police Force by Rank in 1887

Rank	Monthly Salary
<u>European contingent</u>	
Inspector 1 <sup>st</sup> class	S\$100 (no rations)
Inspector 2 <sup>nd</sup> class	S\$80 (S\$5 rations)
Inspector 3 <sup>rd</sup> class	S\$60 (S\$10 rations)
Sergeant	S\$50 (S\$10 rations)
Constable	S\$40 (S\$10 rations)
<u>Local contingent</u>	
Sergeant	S\$15
Corporal	S\$12
Constable 1 <sup>st</sup> class	S\$10
Constable 2 <sup>nd</sup> class	S\$9
Constable 3 <sup>rd</sup> class	S\$8
Peon 1 <sup>st</sup> class	S\$5
Peon 2 <sup>nd</sup> class	S\$4

Source: Quah, "Police Corruption in Singapore," p. 28.

N.B: The exchange rate then was US\$1 = S\$3

## 2.3 Causes of Police Corruption in Colonial Singapore

- ❑ **Ample opportunities for corruption**
  - **Lack of control over policemen in those areas that were most susceptible to corruption provided many opportunities for them to engage in corrupt practices.**
  - **Many local policemen took on second jobs even though it was not permitted to supplement their low salaries.**
  - **They owned buffalo carts and operated food stalls and did not perform their duties impartially because of a conflict of interest.**

## 2.4 Causes of Police Corruption in Colonial Singapore

### ❑ Ineffective anti-corruption measures

- Prevention of Corruption Ordinance, 1937 was ineffective because the 2-year imprisonment meant that **offences** were **not seizable** and police officers required warrants to arrest offenders. (Offences made seizable in 1946).
- Anti-Corruption Branch (ACB) of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the Singapore Police Force (SPF) was ineffective because:
  - (a) It was a **Type B ACA** which performed anti-corruption and 15 non-corruption-related functions;
  - (b) It had only **17 personnel** and had to compete with other branches in CID for limited resources; and
  - (c) Prevalence of police corruption undermined the ACB's effectiveness because of a **conflict of interest**.

### 3. Opium Hijacking Scandal and CPIB's Formation

- ❑ The British colonial government made the ACB of the CID in the SPF responsible for combating corruption in December 1937 even though **police corruption was rampant.**
- ❑ On 27 October 1951, a gang of robbers, including **three police detectives**, stole a shipment of 1,800 pounds of opium worth US\$130,330. This robbery in Singapore arose from competition between the rival factions within the CID. Opium smoking was banned in February 1946 and there were 30,000 opium addicts in Singapore in August 1952.

- ❑ The Opium Hijacking scandal made the British colonial government realise its **mistake** in making the ACB responsible for combating corruption even though the police were corrupt.
- ❑ The government rectified its mistake by making the special team investigating the robbery a **Type A ACA**, known as the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB), outside the SPF's purview in September 1952.
- ❑ The breakthrough in Singapore's and Hong Kong's war on corruption was their **rejection of the British government's method** of relying on the police to curb corruption when they were corrupt and replacing the ACB with the CPIB and ICAC, respectively.

## 4. Police Reforms in Singapore

1. The People's Action Party (PAP) government assumed office in June 1959 and enacted the Prevention of Corruption Act (POCA) in June 1960, which gave the CPIB the legal powers, budget and personnel to enforce the POCA impartially.
2. As part of the PAP government's anti-corruption strategy, these **six reforms** were implemented to minimise corruption in the SPF.
  - ❑ **Improving salaries and working conditions**  
In 1971, the Lee Soo Ann Salary Review Committee recommended between 20% and 25% pay rises for junior police officers, free medical aid and housing for married personnel.

## Singapore Police Force Starting Salary for Direct-Entry Inspector, 2017

Educational Qualification	Starting Monthly Salary*
First Class Honours	S\$4,110 - S\$4,710 (US\$3,022 - US\$3,463)
Second (Upper) Class Honours	(THB99,407 - THB113,919)
Second (Lower) Class Honours	S\$3,500 - S\$4,310
Third Class Honours	(US\$2,574 - US\$3,169)
Pass	(THB84,653 - THB 104,244)

### BENEFITS

Annual Leave of 28 – 35 days

Medical leave of 14 days or 60 days with hospitalisation

Annual study leave of 12 days (Subject to approval)

Degree/Diploma sponsorship (Refer to position)

Subsidised medical and dental fees

Class 3 driving licence

Professional learning and development benefits

Retention and retirement benefits (Refer to position)

Source: <https://www.police.gov.sg/join-us/police-officer>

## Singapore Police Force Starting Salary for Direct-Entry Sergeant, 2017

Educational Qualification	Starting Monthly Salary*
Diploma	S\$1,970 - S\$2,620 (US\$1,459 - US\$1,941)*
GCE 'A' Levels	(THB47,648 - THB63,369)
Higher NITEC	S\$1,820 - S\$2,170 (US\$1,348 - US\$1,607)*
NITEC	(THB44,020 - THB52,485)
GCE 'O' Levels	

### SIGN-ON BONUS

Direct-Entry Sergeants will receive a **Sign-On Bonus of S\$10,000 (THB241,866)** (Higher NITEC, Polytechnics, International Baccalaureate (IB), NUS High School, NAFA, LaSalle and ITE Technical Engineering, or GCE 'A' Levels holders) upon appointment.

### RETENTION BONUS

New officers can look forward to attractive retention bonus pay-outs that reward a longer career with the SPF. They will enjoy **pay-outs** ranging from S\$30,000 to S\$50,000 over their first **13 years of service**.

\*The exchange rate is US\$1 = S\$1.35; S\$1 = 24.19 Thai Baht on 29 November 2017

- ❑ **A Joint CPIB-SPF Task Force** was formed in December 1976 to minimise police corruption.
- ❑ **Improving SPF's recruitment and selection procedures**
  - (a) 31 personnel boards and Public Service Commission are responsible for recruiting and selecting qualified candidates to the SPF on the basis of **merit**.
  - (b) Psychological tests are also used for selection.
  - (c) Selected candidates are only appointed if they are medically fit and pass the security screening.
- ❑ **Training of SPF officers**
  - (a) 6-month basic training at Home Team Academy (HTA)
  - (b) 9-month training at HTA for senior officers
  - (c) Trainees paid full salary and bonded for 2 years after training and confirmed after a year's probation.

## ❑ Values education of SPF officers

- (a) Introduced in 1999 with the inclusion of 40 hours of instruction in code of conduct, police regulations, and government instruction manuals in the basic training courses for junior and senior police officers.
- (b) An annual **ethics seminar** is conducted by the SPF, beginning from 2002, when a values handbook, *A Guide to Ethical Decisions*, was launched to provide some general rules of conduct for SPF officers.
- (c) The handbook defines the six principles of **ethos**, the **law, honour, conflict of interest, consequence**, and **scrutiny**. These principles are illustrated with six scenarios based on actual cases.

## **❑ Administrative measures**

- (a) Rotation of police officers in vulnerable and sensitive posts (such as investigators, anti-vice and gambling suppression officers, and traffic enforcement officers) every 3 or 4 years to reduce corruption opportunities.**
- (b) All civil servants, including police officers, must submit an annual declaration of indebtedness for unsecured debts of more than three months of their monthly salary. Police officers who fail to submit honest declarations are investigated and disciplined.**
- (c) Random testing of police officers for drug abuse was introduced in 2002.**
- (d) From October 2013, all civil servants must declare if they visit the local casinos for more than four times a month.**

**Table 3: Reported Cases of Police Corruption in Singapore, 1996-2011**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Reported cases of police corruption</b>	<b>No. of cases as a % of SPF's personnel</b>
<b>1996</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>0.12</b>
<b>1997</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0.04</b>
<b>1998</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>0.10</b>
<b>1999</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>0.16</b>
<b>2000</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>0.05</b>
<b>2001</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>0.06</b>
<b>2002</b>	<b>NA</b>	<b>NA</b>
<b>2003</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>0.03</b>
<b>2004</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0.02</b>
<b>2005</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0.006</b>
<b>2006</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0.007</b>
<b>2007</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>0.051</b>
<b>2008</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0.006</b>
<b>2009</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>0.065</b>
<b>2010</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0.006</b>
<b>2011</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0.019</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>0.74</b>

**Source: Data provided by courtesy of the SPF's Manpower Department**

## 5. Policy Contexts of Singapore and Thailand

Dimension	Singapore	Thailand	Difference
Land area	719 sq. km	513,120 sq. km	x 714
Population	5,607,280	68,863,510	x 12.3
GDP per capita	US\$52,960	US\$5,907	x 9
CPI 2016	7 <sup>th</sup> (84)	101 <sup>st</sup> (35)	+ 94 (49)
Public trust in politicians	1 <sup>st</sup> /138 (6.4/7.0)	111 <sup>th</sup> /138 (2.2/7.0)	+ 110 (4.2)
Organised crime	7 <sup>th</sup> (6.4)	104 <sup>th</sup> (4.2)	+ 97 (2.2)
Reliability of police services	4 <sup>th</sup> /138 (6.5/7.0)	61 <sup>st</sup> /138 (4.6/7.0)	+ 57 (1.9)
UNODC murder rate 2015	0.25	3.51	+ 3.26
UNODC murder count 2015	14	2,387	+ 2,373

Sources: World Bank data on population and GDP per capita; UNODC; Transparency International; *Global Competitiveness Report 2016-2017*

**Table 4: Perceptions of Corruption in Thailand by Institution, 2013**

Institution or Group	Score (1-5)*
<b>Police</b>	<b>4.0</b>
Political parties	4.0
Public officials	3.7
Parliament	3.4
Business sector	3.2
Education system	3.1
Military	2.8
Media	2.8
Medical and Health	2.8
Judiciary	2.5
Nongovernmental organisations	2.6
Religious bodies	2.4

Source: Transparency International, *Global Corruption Barometer 2013* (Berlin: Transparency International, 2013), p. 38.

\*Score ranges from 1 = not at all corrupt to 5 = extremely corrupt

## Perceptions of Police in Some Asia Pacific Countries, 2015-2017

“People in **Thailand** and Pakistan were particularly likely to think that the **police were highly corrupt**, with over three quarters saying most or all police officers in their country were corrupt (**78 per cent** and 76 per cent). In Australia and Japan, the police were seen as far cleaner with less than one in 10 saying they were highly corrupt (5 and 8 per cent).”

Source: Transparency International, *Asia Pacific Global Corruption Barometer* (Berlin: Transparency International, 2017), p. 10.

## 6. Five Lessons for Thailand

- ❑ Importance of leadership and **political will**
- ❑ Implement **comprehensive** anti-corruption measures
- ❑ **Meritocracy** and quality control of personnel
- ❑ **Improve salaries** and working conditions to prevent corruption
- ❑ **Punish corrupt cops** and reward honest cops

## 6.1 Leadership and Political Will

- The **attitude of the police chief** is an important cause of police corruption because even if he is personally honest, he would shield from public exposure his corrupt colleagues for fear that he would lose his job if the public perceived that his whole department was corrupt. Many police chiefs in the United States were either friends of corrupt officers or **tolerated corrupt behaviour** among their colleagues. They were not concerned with combating corruption in their departments because they were **unable or unwilling to deal with corruption among their colleagues seriously**.  
[Patrick V. Murphy, “Corruptive Influences,” in Bernard L. Garmire (ed.), *Local Government Police Management* Washington, DC: International City Management Association, 1982), p. 62.]

## Tone at the Top

**“The tone set at the top of an organisation is the single most important factor in determining how resistant that organisation will be to fraud and corruption. By tone we mean the cultural, ethical and behavioural patterns, both visible and subliminal, which permeate the whole organisation.”**

**Source: Nigel Iyer and Martin Samociuk, *Fraud and Corruption: Prevention and Detection* (Aldershot: Gower, 2006), p. 23.**

- ❑ The police chief **must not tolerate corruption** in his department and should implement the necessary measures to reduce the incentives and opportunities for corruption among his officers. Police corruption exists when it is tolerated by the police chief.**

- ❑ The SPF's success in curbing corruption also reflects Singapore's effectiveness in minimising corruption. Singapore succeeded in combating corruption because of the **political will** of its first prime minister, the late Lee Kuan Yew, and his colleagues to build a clean and effective government.
- ❑ For Thailand to succeed in curbing police corruption, its political leaders and police commissioner must be committed to corruption control by initiating the necessary reforms to address the causes of corruption in the Royal Thai Police.

## 6.2 Implement Comprehensive Anti-Corruption Measures

- ❑ An effective anti-corruption strategy must reduce the incentives and opportunities for corrupt behaviour and costs of non-corrupt behaviour, and increase the incentives and opportunities for non-corrupt behaviour and the costs of corrupt behaviour.
- ❑ Thus, to curb corruption, **comprehensive measures** must be initiated to address the causes that increase the incentives and opportunities for police corruption.
- ❑ The SPF minimised police corruption by improving the salaries and working conditions of its personnel, working with the CPIB in a joint task force, improving its selection procedures and training programmes, and enforcing administrative measures.

## 6.3 Meritocracy and Quality Control of Personnel

- ❑ There are two options for recruiting candidates to an organisation:
  - (a) **Patronage**: selecting candidates on the basis of race, kinship or other non-achievement criteria, without competition or public advertisement.
  - (b) **Merit**: selecting qualified candidates on the basis of merit by means of competitive examinations, interviews and background checks.
- ❑ The 1854 Northcote-Trevelyan Report recommended that the British Civil Service should replace patronage with meritocracy in recruitment and promotion. The Civil Service Commission was formed in May 1855 and competitive examinations were introduced in 1870.

- ❑ The British colonial government initiated meritocracy by creating the Public Service Commission in January 1951 to recruit and promote the civil servants in Singapore on merit rather than patronage.**
- ❑ The SPF has relied on meritocracy in recruiting eligible candidates and offers four scholarship schemes to attract talented candidates for undergraduate studies abroad or in Singapore. Selected candidates must serve the SPF for six years after graduation.**
- ❑ The SPF provides training and values education to its officers to ensure quality control of its personnel.**

## 6.4 Improve Salaries & Working Conditions to Prevent Corruption

- ❑ In June 2002, Thailand's police chief, General Sant Sarutanond, admitted that Thai policemen "are under-educated and **under-paid** and that is the reason why they are corrupt." He said that Thai commissioned police officers should be paid a monthly salary of 20,000 baht (US\$850) to meet their expenses in large cities, but are actually getting a starting monthly salary of **6,000 baht (US\$260)**. See "Police chief admits: Yes, Thai cops are corrupt, what do you expect?" *Straits Times*, June 5, 2002.
- ❑ In 2012, the monthly salary for entry-level police constables without university education was **6,800 baht**. In June 2015, the *Bangkok Post* reported that: "Thai police officers are paid around **14,760 baht per month** (6,800 – 8,340 baht for entry level) and have to buy their own guns and even office supplies." Peerakit Kamnuansilpa, "PM must seize chance to shake up police," *Bangkok Post*, June 1, 2015.

## “Rewards of job don’t match the risks”

The Thai government provides rent-free apartments for police officers and their families but only 10% can live near the police station. They get free medical care at government hospitals. However, they must buy their own motorcycles if needed for the job. They must also pay for their uniforms, handguns, handcuffs, transceivers, hats and belts. As a good handgun costs 70,000 baht, some officers don’t have a gun as they cannot afford to buy one.

According to Police Colonel Dr Pullop Aramhla, Superintendent of Bang Phli Police Station in Samut Prakan province: “Anyone who puts on a RTP uniform has **a difficult and dangerous job**. ... there are always so many cases ... that we [have] to report for duty at any time, with **no extra pay**, for weekends or public holidays.” Quoted in Maximilian Wechsler, “Why it’s not easy being a Thai police officer,” *The Big Chilli*, July 4, 2016.

**It is difficult to prevent police corruption in Thailand  
when police officers are paid low salaries**

**“You cannot fight corruption on an empty stomach.  
You cannot fight corruption when salaries are below  
real living standards.”**

**Professor Nikos Passas (2015)  
([www.youtube.com/watch?v=d4Dj0qdWLnk](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d4Dj0qdWLnk))**

**“If you pay peanuts you get corrupt monkeys.”**

**Michael Backman, *The Asian Insider* (2004), p. 25.**

## 6.5 Punish Corrupt Cops and Reward Honest Cops

In their analysis of performance discrepancies in organisations, Robert Mager and Peter Pipe contend that people don't perform as expected because:

- They **lack the skill** to perform (genuine skill deficiency)
- They are **punished for performing** as desired
- They are **rewarded for not performing** as desired
- There are **no consequences** for performing at all

Source: Robert F. Mager and Peter Pipe, *Analysing Performance Problems*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition (Atlanta, GA: Center for Effective Performance, 1997), Chapters 4-7.

❑ Applying Mager and Pipe's analysis of performance discrepancies to combating police corruption, the Royal Thai Police must **reward honest police officers** and **punish corrupt police officers**. If corrupt police officers are not detected and punished, their colleagues would be tempted to be corrupt too, thus increasing the extent of police corruption.

❑ Frank **Serpico**, a New York Police Department detective, was punished for refusing to accept bribes. He escaped to Switzerland to avoid being killed by his corrupt colleagues. He said: "We must create an atmosphere where the crooked cop fears the honest cop and not the other way around." Serpico was **punished for being an honest cop**. He returned to the US in 1996 after many years of exile in Europe.

- ❑ In Singapore, corrupt police officers are charged in court if there is sufficient evidence for prosecution. Those officers found guilty are **fined up to S\$100,000** or **imprisoned for up to 5 years or both**.
- ❑ If there is insufficient evidence for court prosecution, corrupt officers who are convicted of departmental charges are punished, depending on the severity of their offences, with one or more of these penalties: dismissal from SPF; reduction in rank; stoppage or deferment of salary increment; fine or reprimand; or retirement from the SPF.
- ❑ **Police officers** who have **rejected bribes** in performing their duties are **publicly recognised** by the SPF for their honesty and incorruptibility.

## 7. Conclusion

- ❑ As police corruption is a serious problem with various causes in many Asian countries, their policy makers should realise that it **cannot be resolved easily** or overnight.
- ❑ Maurice Punch has recommended a cautious approach because “there is **no magic bullet**, no quick fix, and no single measure that works.” What is needed is **a multi-pronged approach**. (See his *Police Corruption: Deviance, Accountability and Reform in Policing* [London: Routledge, 2009], p. 238.)

- ❑ *The Knapp Commission Report on Police Corruption* (1972, p. 17) recommended that police corruption can be reduced by implementing **sustained reforms** with these objectives:
  - (a) Eliminating those situations which expose policemen to corruption, and **controlling exposure** where such hazards are unavoidable.
  - (b) **Reducing temptations** to engage in corrupt activities by police and the public by subjecting them to high risks of detection, arrest, conviction and penalties.
  - (c) Improving **incentives for meritorious police performance**.
  - (d) Changing police attitudes toward corruption.
  - (e) The **public must support** the climate of reform.

- ❑ To minimise police corruption, the Royal Thai Police must have the **political will** to address these causes:
  - (a) **Improve the salaries and working conditions** of its police officers to reduce incentive for corruption.
  - (b) **Punish corrupt police officers** to demonstrate that corruption doesn't pay.
  - (c) **Reward honest police officers** by public recognition of their refusal to accept bribes and giving them a salary increment or faster promotion.
  - (d) **Reduce opportunities for corruption** for policemen in vulnerable posts such as traffic enforcement, anti-vice, narcotics control and gambling suppression.
  - (e) **Introduce values education** as part of the training of Thai police officers.

□ In her analysis of police reform efforts in Thailand from 1973 to 2007, Arisa Ratanapinsiri concluded: “For more than fifty years, each new attempt to reform the police institution has promised to curb the problem of political intervention in police affairs through restructuring. However, **very little has changed**. ... And as long as both sides [politicians and police] can still benefit from, or suffer from, the vicissitudes of a dysfunctional political system and political structure, **any real reform is likely to take a back seat** to the raw quest for political, institutional, or personal advantage.”

[Source: “A History of Police Reform in Thailand,” in Paul Chambers (ed.), *Knights of the Realm: Thailand’s Military and Police: Then and Now* (Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 2013), pp. 525-526.]

- ❑ In spite of Arisa Ratanapinsiri's pessimistic conclusion, this does not mean that police reform in Thailand is unnecessary because **if nothing is done**, the problem of **police corruption will persist and spread** to those honest police officers who will realise that there is **no incentive in being honest** because their corrupt colleagues accept bribes and are not punished for their misconduct.
- ❑ In the final analysis, as the *raison d'être* of the police is to enforce law and order in society and arrest those breaking the law, the persistence of police corruption means that the **police are breaking the law instead of enforcing it and are not punished for their misconduct.**

**“Corruption is the killer disease of good governance. ... Once a culture of corruption has taken hold, it tends to spread to every level of society.”**

**Muhammad Yunus, *A World of Three Zeros* (2017), p. 205.**

**Hence, all of us must do our best to minimise not only police corruption but all forms of corruption in our countries because **the price** for not doing so will be **too high for us to pay**.**

**Let me end by quoting Frank Serpico again:**

**“The only thing I feel I ever accomplished is that I did what I had to do. To improve the world, all of us must begin with ourselves.”**

**Quoted in Jon Wilde, “Frank Serpico: The True Story of the Corruption Busting Cop,” *Sabotage Times*, October 5, 2013.**

**“I tried to be an honest cop in a force full of bribe-takers. But as I found out the hard way, police departments are useless at investigating themselves.”**

**Frank Serpico, “The Police are still out of control,” *Politico*, October 23, 2014.**

## Suggestions for Further Reading

1. Quah, Jon S.T. *Combating Corruption Singapore-Style: Lessons for other Asian Countries*. Baltimore, MD: School of Law, University of Maryland, 2007. Available at: <http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mcsas/vol2007/iss2/1/>.
2. Quah, Jon S.T. "Preventing Police Corruption in Singapore: The Role of Recruitment, Training and Socialisation," *Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration*, 28 (1) (June 2006): 59-75.
3. Quah, Jon S.T. "Curbing Police Corruption in Singapore: Lessons for other Asian Countries," *Asian Education and Development Studies*, 3 (3) (2014): 186-222.